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This thesis presents a new architecture for the reliabl  implementation of the symmetric-key 
algorithm Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Since 
FPGAs are prone to soft errors caused by radiation, and AES is highly sensitive to errors, reliable 
architectures are of significant concern. Energetic particles hitting a device can flip bits in FPGA 
SRAM cells controlling all aspects of the implementation. Unlike previous research, heterogeneous 
error detection techniques based on properties of the circuit and functionality are used to provide 
adequate reliability at the lowest possible cost. The use of dual ported block memory for SubBytes, 
duplication for the control circuitry, and a new enha ced parity technique for MixColumns is 
proposed. Previous parity techniques cover single errors in datapath registers, however, soft errors 
can occur in the control circuitry as well as in SRAM cells forming the combinational logic and 
routing. In this research, propagation of single errors is investigated in the routed netlist. Weaknesses 
of the previous parity techniques are identified. Architectural redesign at the register-transfer level is 
introduced to resolve undetected single errors in both the routing and the combinational logic. 
Reliability of the AES implementation is not only a critical issue in large scale FPGA-based 
systems but also at both higher altitudes and in space applications where there are a larger number of 
energetic particles. Thus, this research is important for providing efficient soft error resistant design 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Modern electronic systems such as computers, network routers, cell phones, and smart cards 
communicate, store, access, or modify information. Almost any system that deals with information 
has security needs provided by cryptographic algorithms, in some way. In general, security 
requirements are categorized into authentication, data confidentiality, data integrity, non-repudiation, 
and access control. It has been observed that the cost of insecurity in electronic systems can be very 
high, and therefore security is an important issue. For instance, a security survey by the Computer 
Security Institute (CSI) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) revealed that just 223 organizations 
sampled from various industry sectors had lost hundreds of millions of dollars due to computer 
related security issues [13]. 
FPGAs have become popular platforms for implementing electronic solutions including security 
related applications that use cryptographic algorithms. Compared to Application Specific Integrated 
Circuits (ASICs), FPGAs provide a shorter time to market, less expensive design process, higher 
level of flexibility for debugging, and even support in field upgrading. Additionally, state of the art 
FPGAs comprise building blocks such as microprocessors, block memories, and logic resources. 
FPGAs attempt to fill the gap between hardware and software through achieving potentially higher 
performance than software, while providing a higher level of flexibility than hardware. For instance, 
high-density SRAM-based FPGAs can be an attractive platform for implementing cryptographic 
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algorithms, since standards change often and some applic tions, such as satellites, may have low 
volume or benefit from in field upgrade. 
Despite all the benefits of SRAM-based FPGAs mentioned above, an important concern is their 
vulnerability to faults caused by radiation. This vulnerability of FPGAs is due to the high density of 
SRAM cells that control all aspects of the implementation. Energetic particles hitting an FPGA can 
cause faults in the device; these faults can affect multiplexers, interconnections, buffers, LUTs, 
control bits, and flip-flops [12].  For example, researchers in the Rosetta experiments [1] reported th  
measurements of approximately 295 and 290 failure in time per million bits of configuration cells in 
0.15 mµ  and 0.13 mµ technologies, respectively. They also reported 265 and 530 failure in time per 
million bits of block memory cells. Since these SRAM cells control the FPGA functionality this study 
of errors caused by radiation is very important. In the Rosetta experiments, the chips were placed in a 
radiation chamber in order to measure the failures from exposure to real particles. This method of 
measuring failures in time with a radiation chamber is normally extremely expensive. The likelihood 
of these errors increases at both higher altitudes and in space applications where there is larger 
number of energetic particles emanating from the sun and other galaxies. Hence resistant design 
against errors caused by radiation in satellite and space applications is an important area of study. 
As technology advances, dimensions decrease, supply voltages and capacitances lower, and clock 
frequencies increase. Technology scaling increases the likelihood of errors caused by radiation in 
semiconductor devices. Density of components increases with minimizing dimensions as technology 
advances. In a system, denser circuitry results in higher number of sensitive nodes in the same area 
compared to older technologies. Since the clock frequencies will continue to increase the likelihood 
that a momentary glitch will be clocked as valid data increases and this error is then propagated 
through the logic path. Consequently, these technology trends conspire to increase semiconductor 
devices susceptibility to radiation. Thus, designin for error resistance is important not only for space 
but for other applications as well. 
Reliability becomes a critical issue especially in large scale systems using multiple FPGAs, since 
the failure in time of a system increases linearly with each additional FPGA. For instance, in 
applications such as banking or ehealth, numerous FPGAs as high performance servers can be used to 
provide security services such as confidentiality or authentication. Additionally, reliability is an 
important issue due to error sensitivity of AES. For example a single bit flip in the early rounds of 
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AES encryption is expected to in 50% erroneous bits in the output. Therefore, designing a highly 
reliable cipher in an FPGA is very important. 
The main focus of this research is on the reliability ssues of the symmetric-key algorithm, AES, 
implemented on an FPGA. Traditionally, there have be n expensive techniques in terms of hardware 
resources (e.g., triple modular redundancy uses more than 3 times as many hardware resources as the 
original design implementation) that provide error detection and correction to increase the reliability 
of a system. On the other hand, there have been other less expensive techniques (e.g., a parity 
technique providing error detection) but they have not provided reliability for all elements in a design 
such as one implemented on an FPGA. Hence there is a need to provide adequate reliability at the 
lowest possible cost. One of the main goals in this research is to enhance the reliability of a low cost 
parity scheme in order to improve the error coverag. Weaknesses of a general parity technique on the 
FPGA are researched. Given that current FPGAs are ve y dense (e.g., Virtex-II Pro FPGA has 
34,292,768 SRAM cells [2]), and that the mapping details of the placed and routed FPGA design are 
proprietary, analyzing the effect of faults on an implementation is very difficult. In order to tackle this 
obstacle, this research exploits the high regularity in the FPGA (e.g., the same basic building block 
containing combinational and sequential elements is repeated throughout FPGA). 
The pin fault model (faults are modeled as occurring on input and output pins of FPGA 
components e.g. look up tables, block memory, etc) is used for modeling and analysis of a wrong 
value in an SRAM cell due to radiation. Then a small portion of the AES is tested by simulating 
single errors (through flipping 1 bit at a time in the configuration file) to verify this model. Since the 
FPGA structure is regular, the result of this verification for this simple yet sufficiently accurate model 
is expanded for the whole device.  
Parity techniques cover single errors in datapath registers, however, errors due to radiation can 
occur in the control circuitry as well as in SRAM cells forming the combinational logic and routing of 
a design implemented on FPGAs. Unlike previous research, propagation of single errors is 
investigated in the AES netlist after placement androuting. In combinational logic or routing, there 
are 2 situations when an error can be undetected. First, if a single error potentially affects an even 
number of data bits. Second, if both data and parity bit are affected by a single error. In these cases, 
LUTs are designed manually in the netlist and extra flip-flops are used at the register-transfer level to 
resolve errors being undetected in combinational logic and routing of FPGA, respectively. 
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There are some parts in the AES algorithm that can benefit from elements available in state of the 
art FPGAs to provide error detection. Therefore, th parity scheme is not used for all transformations 
in AES. For instance, unlike previous research, a du l ported block memory is used in SubBytes of 
AES to provide error detection. Additionally, duplication is used for error detection within the design 
of the control circuitry. By utilizing very few LUTs the overhead of the control circuitry is low. 
An error in an FPGA can significantly modify the functionality of a design. Therefore, if these 
errors are not removed by reconfiguration, the dependability of a correction technique is questionable. 
In order to correct errors, self reconfiguration is demonstrated in this research. In case of an error
occurrence, the AES module interrupts the integrated processor on the FPGA for a reconfiguration. 
The contributions of this research include items as follows. 
 Errors caused by radiation in SRAM-based FPGA are modeled by using the pin fault 
model. Then this simple and accurate enough modeling is verified by simulating errors in 
the configuration file. 
 Radiation faults are simulated by flipping bits of interest in the configuration file that is 
downloaded on the FPGA. The desired net is removed in the placed and routed netlist to 
generate the modified configuration file. Then the modified and original configuration files 
are compared in software written in C++. 
 The weaknesses of the parity scheme in error detection are found through a small design 
implemented on FPGA. The effects of a fault propagatin  to output, while simulating 
errors by flipping bits in the configuration file, are observed.  
 The error coverage of the parity scheme is expanded from the datapath flip-flops to the 
control circuitry, logic blocks, and routing. This improvement is done by mitigating the 
weaknesses in the parity scheme at the register-transfer level. 
 The insufficiency of known error correction techniques such as the triple modular 
redundancy and Hamming code in FPGAs is analyzed and self reconfiguration is suggested 
instead. 
 AES with the enhanced parity scheme is designed and implemented on the FPGA as an IP 
core. Interfacing of the master IP core capable of interrupting the PowerPC 405 processor 
is implemented. 
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1.1 Thesis Organization 
The outline of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, background on radiation effects causing faults 
in semiconductor devices is presented. The sources of radiation effects and their mechanisms causing 
errors in DRAM and SRAM cells are discussed. Definitio  and comparisons of various faults 
including soft errors in a device are provided. Soft errors are dynamic radiation-induced faults which 
generally cause a storage bit to change its value. Methods of estimating errors caused by radiation in a 
device are described. The relationship between technology trends and errors caused by radiation is 
also presented. 
In Chapter 3, soft error mitigation techniques at different levels from hardware to software are 
presented. Peculiar effects of soft errors in SRAM-based FPGAs are discussed and also compared to 
effects in ASICs. 
In Chapter 4, general security requirements of a system such as authentication, data confidentiality, 
data integrity, and non-repudiation are briefly described. Then the primitives to provide these security 
needs (i.e. symmetric-key algorithms, public-key algorithms, and hash functions) are presented. 
Emphasis is placed on the standard symmetric-key algorithm, AES, which is the focus in this 
research. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)-recommended block cipher modes 
are also covered briefly. Error propagation within the AES algorithm (due to confusion and diffusion 
properties) and error propagation in various cipher modes of operation are discussed. Different 
architectures previously used to implement AES are presented. 
In Chapter 5, the proposed AES with soft error detection is introduced. The proposed error 
detection technique uses mathematical properties of AES and available hardware resources on FPGA 
to detect errors in SubBytes and the control circuitry implementations. Enhancements to the parity 
scheme (used for error detection in MixColumns and AddRoundKey) to increase its error coverage are 
also proposed in this research. In order to increase the error coverage of the parity technique, the 
weaknesses of it on FPGA are found and mitigated in the combinational logic and routing.  
In Chapter 6, experimental results and comparisons are discussed. Chapter 7 presents the 
conclusion and future work. The thesis also includes 8 appendices. Appendix A provides a glossary of 
acronyms. In Appendix B, different aspects of design and implementation of the AES module as a 
system on chip on FPGA are covered. This system has the capability to self reconfigure in case of an 
error through the host PC. Communication and synchronization of the proposed AES module, the 
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PowerPC 405 (integrated) processor on the FPGA, and the host PC are described. Device drivers that 
provide interrupt handling of the PowerPC 405 processor and the host PC are presented. Appendix C 
illustrates the state machines of the control circuit y in the proposed AES. In Appendix D, the device 
driver code for FPGA reconfiguration is presented. Appendix E shows the processor local bus 
interface. S-box of AES and pseudo code for key expansion are provided in Appendices F and G, 
respectively. In Appendix H, routed netlist snapshot  from FPGA Editor are provided. 
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Chapter 2 
Radiation Effects on Devices 
This chapter provides an introduction to radiation effects in semiconductor devices. Radiation 
sources and their effects are briefly presented. Specific mechanisms causing errors through radiation 
effects in storage elements including DRAM and SRAM are discussed. A comparison of radiation 
faults, faults injected by an attacker in cryptographic algorithms such as AES (the focus of the 
research), and faults caused in manufacturing is pre ented. Methods of estimating soft errors, which 
are caused by radiation, in a device are described. The relationship between technology trends and 
soft errors is also presented at the end of this chapter. Before proceeding to details, some 
terminologies used in this thesis are described for clarification.  
2.1 Radiation Sources and Soft Error Mechanisms 
Faults in a device do not necessarily cause errors in output results. For instance, in an FPGA a fault 
that happens in an unused resource does not cause an error at the output. Error mitigation techniques 
do not have to necessarily provide error correction. O  the other hand, tolerance to error includes 
correction of error. 
Energetic particles hitting an electronic device cause disturbances which typically are referred to as 
single event effects. Researchers have discovered various sources causing these effects either directly 
or indirectly through nuclear reactions between the particles and other materials in the struck device. 
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In addition to short-term radiation effects, other effects that are the result of cumulative long-term 
ionizing damage in a device are known as total ioniz ng dose effects. These effects encompass those 
that appear from long-term absorption of radiation over time. On the other hand, short-term effects 
are caused by the passage of a single ionizing particle through a device. Total ionizing dose effects 
can cause devices to suffer threshold shifts, increased device leakage and power consumption, timing 
changes, and etc [3]. Fabrication process-based techniques such as epitaxial CMOS process and 
silicon-on-insulator can reduce total ionizing dose effects [4]. Most solutions to total ionizing dose 
effects are fabrication process-based techniques or replacement of parts. The main focus of this 
research is on the short-term upsets caused by radiation. These short-term effects are provided later in 
this chapter. 
Radiation effects have become an issue due to technology scaling. One of the first manifestations 
of radiation effects in literature were found in the process toward higher levels of integration in 
memory circuits at Intel [5, 6]. Specifically, researchers at Intel observed significant error rate 
increase in DRAM as integration density increased to 16kb and 64kb in the late 1970s. As shown in 
Figure 1 (SER refers to soft error rate), DRAM single bit error rate due to radiation has decreased by 
a factor of 4 to 5 per generation since then by mitigation techniques discussed in Chapter 3. However, 
due to increased demands for memory density (memory size per system being a microprocessor with 
embedded memories) the overall system error rate shown in Figure 1 caused by radiation has 
remained approximately the same. For instance, the size of the main memory of microprocessors has 
increased from 1kb in the 1970s to beyond 1Gb. Thus, t ere is significantly larger number of memory 
cells that can potentially cause a system failure in a modern microprocessor. 
 





Figure 1 DRAM error soft error rate caused by radiation [7] 
 
Compared to DRAM, early SRAM was more robust to single event effects. In recent technology 
(less than 0.25 mµ ), SRAM bit error rate has not increased. However, exponential growth in the 
amount of SRAM for instance in microprocessors and digital signal processors has resulted in the 
system error rate to increase with each generation. This trend is of great concern to manufacturers 
because SRAM constitutes a large part of all advanced Integrated Circuits (ICs) today. 
 A particle can pass through a semiconductor material, f ee electron-hole pairs along its path, and 
deposit energy directly. In addition to that, a particle can lose energy through indirect mechanisms by 
interacting with the struck material. Since radiation effects were discovered in semiconductor devices, 
3 main sources described below have been found that are responsible for single event effects at 
terrestrial levels [7]. 
 One source is alpha particles that can be emitted by small traces of radioactive impurities, 
such as uranium and thorium, in packaging materials. The extent of radiation depends on 
the quality and purification grade of the materials. Another source of alpha particles is 
solder bumps especially those that are near areas sensitive to radiation, for instance, SRAM 
and DRAM cells on a chip.  
 Another source of single event effects is particles g nerated when ever-present cosmic rays 
enter earth’s atmosphere. For instance, high energy neutrons are one of these predominant 
particles. It should be noted that disturbances caued by these particles are more significant 
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in higher altitudes. High energy neutrons striking a device can cause displacement in the 
silicon lattice. 
 Interactions of cosmic rays with materials on the struck device can also cause single event 
effects indirectly; an example is interaction of low energy neutrons in cosmic rays and 
boron. Boron is a dopant used in silicon devices for the formation of p-type regions. Boron 
is also in borophosphosilicate glass (BPSG) used in insulator layers of a device in older 
technologies (e.g., 0.25 and 0.18mµ SRAM cells fabricated with BPSG). 
Single event effects can manifest themselves in various ways in an implementation. They might 
change the logic state, cause a transient disruption, or some types might even lead up to permanent 
destructive failures in a device. In general, if the damage is unrecoverable in a device it is considered 
as a hard error. Depending on their damage, single event effects are classified as follows [8][9].  
 A single event latch-up occurs when current forces through the substrate; this might 
destroy the device. 
 A single event gate rupture happens when there is a conducting path in the gate oxide; this 
destroys the gate control structure. 
 A Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI) triggers an operation of the support circuitry 
and stops the normal operation of the device. The support circuitry in FPGAs provides the 
configuration capability, power on, reset, JTAG functionality and etc. For example, an 
SEFI that affects the power-on-reset circuitry can use the current design on the FPGA to 
be lost in an attempt by the power-on-reset circuity triggering reconfiguration [10]. 
 A Single Event Transient (SET) occurs when the charge collected generates voltage/current 
transitions which are commonly known as glitches. 
 A Single Event Upset (SEU) flips the value of a single storage element or memory cell. For 
example, this could be a Look Up Table (LUT) element, D flip flop, block memory cell, or 
configuration memory cell affected by an SEU. Hence, SEUs are an important concern in 
SRAM-based FPGAs. 
 A Multiple Bit Upset (MBU) causes more than one adjacent bit to flip depending on its 
strike angle. 
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Soft errors are recoverable errors. It should be not d that the likelihood of SEFIs and MBUs is 
extremely low. Therefore, the main concerns in softerrors are SEUs and SETs. It should be noted that 
MBUs are important in differential fault attacks discussed in Section 2.2.2. 
The magnitude of the disturbance a particle causes depends on its Linear Energy Transfer (LET) 
that is defined as deposited energy per unit length. The unit of LET is typically 2 /MeVcm mg, since 
energy per unit distance length ( /MeV cm) is normalized by the density of the material struck 
( 3/mg cm ). For instance, in silicon, an LET of 97 2 /MeVcm mg corresponds to a charge 
deposition of 1 /pC mµ [11]. Typically, more massive and energetic particles in denser materials 
have higher LET [7]. 
In general, charge collection happens within a micron or 2 of the junction (boundary interface 
where the 2 regions of the semiconductor meet). The rev rse-biased junction (p-type and n-type 
regions are connected to negative and positive voltages, respectively) is usually the most sensitive 
part of a circuit in charge collection, in particular if the junction is floating or weakly driven [7]. The 
high electric field in the reverse-biased junction depletion region (an insulating region with no free 
charge carriers) assists collection of charge. Strikes near a depletion region can also result in effici nt 
charge collection. 
At the beginning of an ionizing radiation event, a tr ck of electron-hole pairs in the form of 
cylinder is shaped Figure 2(a). This cylindrical track with a submicron radius has high carrier 
concentration. Then the electric field rapidly collects the carriers causing a glitch Figure 2(b) and 
forms the field funnel [7]. This funneling effect, shown in Figure 2(b), increases charge collection at 
the struck node by extending the high electric field at the junction deep towards the substrate. This 
part of charge collection phase completes within tens of picoseconds. The following phase in charge 
collection is diffusion in which electrons diffuse into the depletion region. Diffusion takes longer in 
the range of hundreds of nanoseconds. It ends when all excess carries are collected, recombined, or 
diffused away from the junction. 
 





Figure 2 Charge collection in a reverse-biased junctio : (a) formation of electron-hole pairs, (b) 
funnel shape field extending deep into substrate, (c) diffusion process [7] 
 
In order to further clarify errors by soft errors, the mechanisms causing errors in DRAM and 
SRAM cells are briefly presented. The DRAM cell illustrated in Figure 3 has an access transistor and 
a storage capacitor. There are 2 main parameters related to DRAM errors when an ion strikes a cell. 
The first parameter is the critical charge (denoted critQ  is defined as the minimum amount of charge 
collected at a sensitive node that can cause an error) that is closely connected to the concept of noise 
margin. The second parameter is the critical time window when the disturbance can get stored in the 
DRAM cell. Due to dynamics of the DRAM cell, timing of the strike is also an important factor; 
meaning the strike has to happen in the critical time window. 
As shown in Figure 3, one of the most sensitive parts in the DRAM cell is the storage capacitor and 
the source of the access transistor. Ion strikes at these 2 nodes directly affect the stored charge and 
consequently the information stored in the DRAM cell.  
Errors can be caused by ion strikes at bit lines as well. This happens when bit lines are in a floating 
voltage state, for instance, during a read operation. Therefore, an ion strike must happen in this 
critical time window.  The disturbance caused at bit lines can reduce the sensing signal due to charge 
imbalance either prior to or during the sensing operation (when the sense amplifier amplifies the 
small differential voltage between the bit lines to the full swing). 
Another mechanism (named the combined cell-bit line failure mode [12]) that can cause an error in 
the DRAM cell is the combination of the 2 mechanisms discussed above. In the combined cell-bit line 
Chapter 2: Radiation Effects on Devices 
 
 13 
failure mode, either of the mechanism above does not individually exceed critQ . However, when 
combined together, they can cause an error. 
 
 
Figure 3 DRAM cell: (a) circuit, (b) layout [11] 
 
The error mechanism in the SRAM cell is quite different from the DRAM cell due to the feedback 
loop formed by the cross-coupled inverter pairs in the SRAM cell circuit. A typical SRAM cell with 6 
transistors is shown in Figure 4 where the positive feedback loop is formed by cross-coupled inverters 
1Q - 3Q  and 2Q - 4Q  [13].  
 
 
Figure 4 Six transistor SRAM cell [13] 
Chapter 2: Radiation Effects on Devices 
 
 14 
Typically, the most sensitive part in the SRAM sell is the reverse-biased drain junction of a 
transistor when it is off [11]. Charge collected by the junction lead to a transient current in the struck 
transistor. This triggers a response in the SRAM cell that is similar to a write pulse and can cause a bit 
flip in the SRAM cell. 
For instance, in the 6 transistor SRAM cell shown in F gure 4, the node storing a ‘1’ is the most 
sensitive node to errors. The reason behind this is the low critQ  for a 1 0→  transition. A 0 1→  
transition needs critQ  that is about 22 times larger than that of a 1 0→  transition [13]. The state of 
the storage node storing a ‘1’ is supported by a rel tiv ly weak PMOS pull-up transistor. 
Consequently, critQ  of an SRAM cell is defined by critQ  of a node storing a ‘1’. 
2.2 Comparison of Soft Errors to Other Faults 
In this section, we discuss the causes of other faults found in implementations, including faults 
during the manufacturing of a device and faults injected during a cryptographic attack. These are all 
different in nature; therefore, they need relevant mitigation techniques. The basic differences among 
these different faults are briefly described as follows.  
2.2.1 Manufacturing Faults 
Manufacturing faults are usually due to deformation of IC elements. There are global faults in 
manufacturing processes that affect large areas of fabricated silicon wafers in a uniform manner. On 
the other hand, there are spot faults affecting a very small area of fabricated silicon area which are 
much more difficult to detect. Spot faults are in general due to an extra or missing material in one of 
the layers (i.e. conductive, semiconductive, and insulating layers). Spot faults include: shorts due to 
extra conducting/semiconducting material or missing i sulating material, breaks due to missing 
conducting/semiconducting material or extra insulating materials, new parasitic elements, and 
elements with degraded performance [14].  
Manufacturing faults can be intermittent due to unstable or marginal hardware. As opposed to 
permanent faults that always exist, intermittent faults do not happen all the time. Their occurrences 
(activation and deactivation) depend on environmental conditions. Intermittent faults happen 
repeatedly at the same locations, while soft errors are random in space. Additionally, when the 
environmental conditions are encouraging, intermittent faults tend to happen in bursts, while soft 
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errors are random in time. Another key difference is that replacement or repair can resolve 
intermittent faults, but this is not the case for sft errors [15]. 
Fault models typically represent consequences of faults t the abstracted logic level. For instance, 
the stuck-at model indicates a wire is a ‘0’ (connected to ground) or ‘1’ (connected to supply voltage). 
Bridging faults between outputs and can be modeled by logic gates. 
One major group of manufacturing faults is opens and shorts described by the stuck-at modeling. 
For instance, this can happen in a pass transistor a  part of the programmable interconnect point in 
routing of FPGA. This pass transistor is controlled by an SRAM cell, shown in Figure 5. A short or 
open causes the pass transistor to be permanently closed or open, regardless of the value of the 
SRAM cell controlling it [16]. However, when an SEU happens in the same scenario, it flips the 
value of the SRAM cell controlling the pass transistor. The case of an SEU is similar to loading the 
FPGA with a different configuration file. The configuration file (also known as programming or 
bitstream file) of the SRAM-based FPGA defines an implementation (basically, the values stored in 
LUTs and block memory, the interconnection between resources, and the modes of the resources e.g., 
I/O standards, I/O drive strengths and LUT modes) [17]. 
 
 
Figure 5 Faults: (a) soft error causing bit flip (b) manufacturing open wire  
 
Manufacturing fault detection techniques usually include loading test configuration files and 
applying test vectors to detect faults. Test vectors can be generated externally or internally as in bu lt-
in self test. Since SEUs do not cause configuration-independent affects compared to shorts and opens 
and can be fixed by reconfiguration, the above offline method for detecting manufacturing fault does 
not apply to SEUs. 
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2.2.2 Fault Attacks 
There are faults that are injected by an attacker to ob ain some secret information. The goal in fault 
attacks is to replace the valid results with invalid results (causing errors in results) to perform the 
cryptanalysis. There are various ways to cause an error during a cryptographic operation, e.g., 
variations in supply voltage so the processor misinterprets or skips instructions [18], variations in the
external clock, and lasers. 
Fault injection can be with or without contact [19]. In a fault injection with contact, there is direct 
physical contact with the chip (e.g., at a pin) to cause voltage or current changes.  For instance, in 
spike attacks the supply voltage is set to violate the operating voltage range tolerated by the chip. This
voltage variation can be exploited to produce a wrong result that might be useful for fault analysis to 
get some secret information from the cryptosystem.  An attacker needs to find specific parameters for 
a spike (in terms of timing and shape of a spike) to produce wrong results that could be used to 
perform the cryptanalysis successfully. 
Another approach to inject errors within the cipher is to manipulate the clock signal so that it 
violates its operating characteristics [20]. For insta ce, the operating clock voltage or the rise or fall 
time can be set so that it will not fit within the proper range. However, generating a clock signal that 
is deviated in such a way that causes the desirable wrong ciphertext might be a challenge, since 
changing the clock signal can potentially cause the chip to lose its functionality. 
In contrast to fault injection with contact, techniques such as heavy ion radiation and 
electromagnetic interference can be used in a fault injection without contact. For instance, light can be 
used to inject errors in non-volatile memory cells. It was shown that camera flash light can be used to 
target the memory of a microcontroller to set or reset an individual bit at a specified time [21]. 
Researchers in [22] showed that a non-volatile memory in a microcontroller can be erased by a UV-C 
light with the wavelength of 254nm. They demonstrated an attack on a software AES imple entation. 
It was shown that if a single byte of the S-box is changed and key expansion is not affected, 2500 
pairs of correct and faulty encrypted inputs are sufficient to recover the key with a probability of 90% 
on an 8-bit microcontroller [22]. 
Electromagnetic emissions can also be used to induce c rrent and target sensitive spots of the chip 
(e.g., memory) [23]. This approach is not invasive in the sense that one does not need to open the 
chip. 
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The accuracy of fault injections, in order to extrac  secret information, is an important factor in a 
successful cryptanalysis. For instance, the level of control over location and timing of fault injections 
is important for fault analysis. A technique such as a spike attack is random in terms of the location of 
faults while an optical attack provides accurate targeting of location [20]. Another important aspect is 
the number of faults injected.  Depending on the fault ttack, a single fault or multiple faults may be
needed for cryptanalysis. 
The first theoretical model for breaking cryptosystems by exploiting random hardware faults was 
introduced in [24]. In this research, it was shown that fault attacks were effective in the RSA system 
and Rabin signatures. The attacks were also applied to the Fiat-Shamir and Schnorr identification 
schemes. Fault attacks depend on how a cryptosystem i  implemented. For instance, the fault attack in 
[24] on RSA is effective on the Chinese remainder based implementation. The attack in [24] is briefly 
summarized as follows. Based on the Chinese remainder the RSA signature E  can be computed as 
follows. 
 
 1 2 modE aE bE N= +  (1) 
where N is the RSA modulus (N=p*q; p and q are prime), 1 mod
private keyE Message p=  and 
2 mod
private keyE Message q= . 
Assuming 'E  is a faulty signature and 2 2'E E=  (meaning no faults during computation of 2E ) it 
is observed that 
 
 
1 2 1 2
1 1
' ( ' ' )
( ' )
E E aE bE aE bE
a E E
− = + − +
= −
 (2) 
If 1 1( ' )E E−  is not divisible by p , then N  is factored as shown in Equation 3 and the 
cryptosystem is compromised. 
 
 gcd( ', )q E E N= −  (3) 
 
Chapter 2: Radiation Effects on Devices 
 
 18 
There are also reported fault attacks on symmetric-key algorithms. Differential Fault Analysis 
(DFA) was proposed by researchers as an attack against DES in [25]. The full DES key was extracted 
by analysis of 50 to 200 ciphertexts which were generated from unknown but related plaintexts [25]. 
Additionally, the same attack (with the same number of given ciphertexts) applied on TDEA resulted 
in a successful cryptanalysis. 
Since AES does not have the Feistel structure as inDES, it is not possible to apply the fault attack 
introduced in [25] on AES. DFA against the AES was subsequently proposed in [20, 26-28]. 
Intermediate states are changed by faults injected in these attacks. There are also DFA against the key 
expansion of AES reported in [29, 30] 
As shown in Figure 6, an attack based on injecting si le faults in the intermediate result of the 
initial AddRoundKey transformation was introduced in [20]. The plaintext is set to 0 (every bit is a 
‘0’) and it is assumed that the attacker knows the correct ciphertext and his goal is finding the key. It 
is observed that 
 
 0initial AddRoundKey result initial Round Key= +  (4) 
Or equivalently: 
 initial AddRoundKey result initial Round Key=  (5) 
 
Then the attacker injects a ‘0’ at every bit location of the initial AddRoundKey result. If the 
round key bit is a ‘0’ then the ciphertext is correct. On the other hand, if the round key bit is a ‘1’ then 
the ciphertext is wrong. Since it is assumed the attacker knows the correct ciphertext he is able to 
distinguish a wrong ciphertext from the right ciphertext. This process is repeated 128 times for all the 












Figure 6 AES fault injection [20] 
 
The assumption of the attacker being able to attack a specific single bit within the first round key is 
strong in the sense that it might not be practically feasible.  This is where probabilistic fault analysis 
comes into play. In this case, the probability of an attack being successful or unsuccessful is also 
considered.  
Another technique proposed in [20] is based on using the timing attack on AES (this was suggested 
by Koeune and Quisquater [31]) in a fault based cryptanalysis. Approximately 16 faulty ciphertexts 
were claimed to be sufficient to extract 1 byte of the key. 
Researchers in [30] described 2 different attacks on AES by injecting faults. The first attack 
assumes a fault on only one bit of an intermediate result at the beginning of the final round. The 
location of a fault should be chosen. Fifty faulty ciphertexts were used to obtain the key completely. 
The second attack [30], which is more realistic, considers injecting faults in a whole byte. 
Researchers then performed differential fault analysis that resulted in obtaining the full 128-bit AES 
key with less than 250 faulty ciphertexts [30]. 
Researchers in [26] supposed that a single byte of he state after the ShiftRows of round 9 can be 
changed and the index of the faulty element of state is known. It is assumed the new value of the 
element of the state is unknown. The injected fault spreads over 4 bytes of the output state. A set of 
possible fault values for each faulty element of the output state is found. Possible fault values are 
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intersected for all the 4 faulty elements to reduce th  number of required ciphertext for the 
cryptanalysis. Then possible values for 4 elements of the last round key are deduced. Four bytes of 
the 10th round key is obtained by more ciphertexts [26].  
In fault attacks, faults are aimed at results (or registers). However, in the case of soft errors the 
perspective is broader in the sense that faults can affect registers, combinational logic and routing on 
a FPGA. Therefore, it is important that faults affecting parts other than registers be considered 
throughout the design as well. The occurrence of multiple faults is important in fault injection [32] 
since it is easier for an attacker to inject multiple faults (e.g. target a byte, than a single bit). On the 
other hand, in radiation faults the likelihood of single faults is exceedingly higher than multiple faults 
[33]. As opposed to fault injection mitigation techniques, the accumulation of faults is important in 
the case of SEUs. For instance, a strong method that detects and corrects errors is not sufficient, sice 
the accumulation of faults over time will destroy the functionality of the method itself. 
In this research, the main goal of error detection is in terms of reliability. However, the proposed 
technique can be applied against cryptanalysis of AES in the circumstances that follow. Multiple 
errors are detected in the SubBytes transformation, as will be described in Section 5.1.1. Therefore, 
the proposed error detection technique may be used against faults attacks where multiple attacks are 
injected during SubBytes. For MixColumns and AddRoundKey transformations, detection of a single 
or an odd number of errors is provided, as described in Section 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.2.2, and 5.2.3. 
Therefore, in scenarios where the number of bits flpped in these two AES transformations is not 
always even, the proposed method may be used against f ult attacks. For example, attacks such 
as [20] (a fault is injected after the initial AddRoundKey) or the first attack in [30] (a fault injected at 
the beginning of the final round) may be thwarted by the proposed thesis work. 
2.3 Estimating Soft Error Rates of a Device 
Estimating soft errors of a device is complex and estimations of different studies also vary. There 
are 3 known approaches for the soft error rate estimation: accelerated testing using particle beams, 
software simulation of circuit, and estimation by real particles. 
In accelerated testing [1][34], a device is subjected to particle beams generated by accelerators. For 
instance, researchers in [1] at the Los Alamos Nation l Laboratory have used a linear accelerator that 
produces an 800MeV pulsed proton beam that strikes a water cooled tungste  target. This generates a 
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spectrum of neutrons whose energy distribution and intensity are precisely measured. The energy of 
this spectrum, which is similar to atmospherics spectrum, is in the range of 1MeV to 600MeV. There 
is also a neutron flight path (20m from the neutron production target) with an irradiation building 
where a device to be tested is placed in. The neutron beam is controlled by opening and closing a 
shutter. The angle of incidence is an important parameter in the estimation results of the soft error 
rate. The flux increase for higher than the sea level altitudes can be computed by assuming a 30% 
increase for every 1000ft rise in altitude (a commonly used rule to the measured flux versus altitude 
below 40000ft). It should be noted that predicting atmospheric neutron flux in accelerated testing 
using particle beams is not exact. This is shown in [35] through investigation of different studies on 
terrestrial neutron flux. If the particle beam experiments are intended to predict actual soft error rates, 
the results can be different by a factor of 10 since there is a wide variation in energy versus flux as 
reported by the various studies [1]. 
Another approach to estimate soft error rate is software circuit simulation to determine the critical 
charge a particular node or latch can handle before it changes state, causing a bit flip. Different 
models of critQ  have been proposed in [36][37-40]. Furthermore, th impact of process variation on 
critQ  is investigated in [41]. Models that have been repo ted generally agree on the qualitative 
definition of critQ ; however, they are different in quantitative description [41] . Each modeling of 
critQ  has its own limitations, for instance, the impact of a parameter might be underestimated or 
overestimated according to certain assumptions. 
Another method to estimate soft error rate is to subject devices to real atmospheric radiation. In 
order to provide sufficient data, a large number of devices go under test. An extensive test on FPGAs 
is conducted in the Rosetta experiment [1] at different altitudes. The experimental setup in [1], shown 












Table 2.1 FPGAs under test in Rosetta experiment [1] 
Node technology in m Die Locations Altitude in feet # of devices Device hours 
San Jose 0 100 1060000 
New Mexico 5100 100 1670000 
White Mountain 12470 100 856800 
150 2V6000 
Mauna Kea 13200 100 353000 
San Jose 0 200 1191000 
New Mexico 5100 200 709000 130 2VP50 
White Mountain 12470 200 655000 
90 S31500 San Jose 0 500 256000 
90 V4LX25 San Jose 0 100 20000 
 
The Failure In Time (FIT, where 1 FIT is 1 bit flip in billion hours of a device) values of 
configuration cells at the sea level in the Rosetta xperiments are obtained for different technologies 
as follows: 295 FIT/Mb for the 0.15 mµ  node, 290 FIT/Mb for the 0.13 mµ node. Furthermore, there 
are 265 FIT/Mb and 530 FIT/Mb for block memory cells in the Rosetta experiments.  
Soft errors increase as the altitude increases; therefor , applications suffer more severely in space 
than at terrestrial levels. Table 2.1 shows the mean time to error for a Virtex-II FPGA in a 
geosynchronous orbit in the case of SEUs in configuration memory, block memory, and power-on-
reset circuitry SEFI [9]. 
 
Table 2.2 Mean time to error of Virtex-II (device XQR2V6000) in a geosynchronous orbit [9] 
 Mean time to error 
SEU in configuration cells 1.8 hours 
SEU in block memory 11.8 hours 
Power-on-reset circuitry SEFI 221 years 
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The FPGA architecture uses memory cells to control every programmable function and feature. 
Therefore, adding costly redundant circuitry to tackle soft errors can make the FPGA cost too high to 
be commercially viable. 
2.4 Technology Trends and Soft Errors 
As technology improves, dimensions decrease, supply vo tages and capacitances lower, and 
frequencies increase. Density of components increases with minimizing dimensions as technology 
advances. Consequently, denser circuitry results in higher number of sensitive nodes in the same area 
compared to older technologies. Furthermore, smaller layout dimensions reduce capacitance of a 
node; this reduces critQ   which is related to noise margin as well. Thus, a maller charge deposited 
can upset a node. critQ  is further decreased by lowering supply in advanced technologies. Since the 
clock frequencies continue to increase as technology advances the likelihood that a momentary glitch 
(SET) is propagated through the logic path and clocked as valid data increases. Consequently, all 
these technology trends unfortunately conspire to increase semiconductor devices susceptibility to 
radiation. Thus, designing for soft error resistance is important not only for space but for other 
applications as well. 
DRAM cells were among the most vulnerable elements in earlier technologies in the late 1970s. 
Early DRAM cells stored a bit value in 2-dimensional p-n junctions. Those DRAM cells were highly 
sensitive to radiation due to large planar reverse-biased junctions. The more compact 3-dimentional 
design of DRAM cell with a much smaller charge collection at p-n junction significantly decreased 
the vulnerability of DRAM cells to radiation. This 3-dimenetional design even compensated other 
adversely contributing factors (e.g., shrinking supply voltages) such that the soft error rate decreased 
for next generations, overall. However, the system soft error rate remains approximately the same due 
to denser DRAMs in a system in recent generations. 
Compared to early DRAMs, early SRAMs were more robust against radiation mainly due to the 
feedback loop in their structure. However, in recent t chnologies, the SRAM cell area and therefore 
the junction area as well as the supply voltage has decreased. All these factors increase sensitivity to 
radiation. The SRAM bit soft error rate is saturated for technology nodes beyond 0.25mµ  [33] due to 
the saturation of VDD scaling, reductions in junction collection efficiency of highly doped p-n 
junctions, and the increased charge sharing between th  eighboring nodes. However, the exponential 
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growth of SRAM density in state of the art processor  has led the SRAM system (referring to a 
microprocessor with embedded memories) soft error rate to increase with each technology generation. 
 
 
Figure 7 SRAM system soft error rate increasing while b t soft error rate being about constant [33] 
 
If an SET (radiation-induced glitch) actually propagates to the input of a latch or flip-flop and 
meets the timing requirements (setup and hold times), the erroneous input will be latched and stored. 
In older technologies, an SET could not propagate because it usually could not produce a full output 
swing or was quickly attenuated because of large load capacitances and large propagation delays. In 
advanced technologies, where the propagation delay is reduced and the clock frequency is high, an 
SET can more easily traverse many logic gates, and the probability that it is latched increases. SET-
induced soft errors are not expected to become an issue until the technology reaches or goes beyond 
the 65nm node [7]. Once an SET can propagate easily, synchro ous and especially asynchronous 
(without clock signal) circuits would be extremely sensitive to such events. In technology beyond 
90nm and at high operating clock frequencies, there is increased likelihood that a large fraction of 
observed soft errors will be related to SETs being stored [7]. 
An important bottleneck in recent technologies is the increase in the sub-threshold leakage power 
due to decrease in the threshold voltage (the threshold voltage is lowered to maintain enough gate 
overdrive and improve performance).  Lowering the treshold voltage causes the transistor sub-
threshold leakage current to increase exponentially. Therefore, the supply voltage is lowered to 
minimum level to reduce the sub-threshold leakage power. However, lowering the supply voltage 
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decreases critQ  and thus increases vulnerability to radiation. It is important to consider the power 
reduction benefit vs. reliability concerns when choosing the minimal supply voltage [13]. 
2.5 Summary 
The main goal of this chapter was to provide some background on radiation effects in 
semiconductor devices, known as single event effects. The sources of single event effects and their 
mechanisms causing errors in a DRAM and SRAM cells were discussed. The focus of this research is 
on soft errors including SEUs and SETs that are of great concern with respect to reliability.   
A comparison of radiation faults, faults injected by an attacker in cryptographic algorithms, and 
faults caused in manufacturing was presented. Methods of estimating soft errors that are accelerated 
testing using particle beams, software simulation of circuit, and estimation by real particles, in a 
device were described.  
The relationship between technology trends and soft errors was also presented. It was shown that 
the technology scaling (decreasing dimensions, supply voltages, and capacitances while increasing 
clock frequencies) increase the likelihood of soft errors in a system. 
In the next chapter, previous research on tackling soft errors at different levels is presented. In 
SRAM-based FPGAs, peculiar effects of soft errors are discussed and also compared to effects in 
ASICs.  
 
  26 
Chapter 3  
Previous Research on Tackling Soft Errors 
 
Soft error mitigation techniques range from low level hardware all the way up to software 
techniques. In this chapter, different techniques at the fabrication process level, circuit and system 
level including error detection and correction codes, and also software mitigation methods used in 
microprocessors are presented. Peculiar effects of soft errors in SRAM-based FPGAs are discussed. 
Furthermore, insufficiencies of ASIC methods which deal with soft errors on FPGAs are pointed out.  
The first mitigation step would be to remove the sources causing soft errors that exist inside a 
device (refer to Section 2.1). These sources are related to the purity of materials used in the 
manufacturing process and packaging of a chip. For instance, in order to reduce alpha particle 
emissions, semiconductor manufacturers use extremely high purity materials to make sure they have 
acceptably low alpha emissions [7]. Another example is removing BPSG, which could cause soft 
errors indirectly, from virtually all advanced technologies. Figure 7 shows the reduction of soft error 
rate by elimination of BPSG in SRAM cells. Solders, mold, and underfill compounds with reduced 
emission rates also need to be chosen carefully. 
When all the internal sources of soft errors are eliminated as much as feasible, there are still 
external sources that cause considerable number of soft errors. For instance, a large portion of high 
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energy cosmic neutrons will always reach devices and cause soft errors, and thus high energy cosmic 
neutrons ultimately become the main concern in causing soft errors [33].  
Further mitigation techniques (other than removing radiation sources) can be roughly classified into 
3 categories. At the lowest level, that is fabrication process (or technology) level, mitigation 
techniques require fundamental changes to the underlying fabrication technology used to manufacture 
ICs. Circuit level techniques rely on changes in the circuit design and layout to reduce sensitivity to 
soft errors.  Eventually, any circuit or layout modification that increases critQ  while maintaining or 
reducing collQ  (collected charge) improves resistance against soft errors. At the highest level in 
hardware, system level techniques tackle soft errors by applying changes to the architecture of the 
system. Combining these techniques at different levels might provide the most efficient solution 
overall for a high-reliability application [7]. 
3.1 Fabrication Process Level Techniques to Tackle Soft Errors 
A fundamental mitigation method for soft errors is to reduce charge collection at sensitive nodes in 
devices [11]. Substrate structures or doping profiles that decrease the depth from which carriers can 
be collected can reduce the charge collected.  For instance, this can be accomplished in DRAMs and 
SRAMs by introducing extra doping layers to limit sub trate charge collection [42]. In SRAMs, 
triple-well [43] and even quadruple-well structures [44] (these use multiple-well isolation) have been 
suggested to decrease sensitivity to soft errors. In multiple-well isolation, all strikes basically happen 
inside the well. Layers can also be used to provide an internal electric field that opposes collection of 
charge deposited in the substrate [45, 46] . Even usi g an epitaxial substrate instead of a bulk 
substrate reduces charge collection to some extent [11]. An epitaxial substrate consists of a heavily 
doped, low-resistance bulk substrate topped by a lightly doped, higher-resistance epitaxial layer [47]. 
The upper layer in is thin and extremely pure semiconductor that is chemically deposited in wafer 
using a process called epitaxial growth [48]. For instance, the radiation-tolerant Virtex-4QV FPGA 
technology incorporates a thin epitaxial layer in the wafer manufacturing process for single event 
latch-up immunity [49]. For each Virtex-4QV device type, the latch-up immunity at maximum CCV  
and operating temperature, subjected to a heavy ion flue ce exceeding 1.107 2/particles cm , with 
LET exceeding 125 2 /MeVcm mg, is verified [49]. 
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In silicon devices, another effective technique used for reducing charge collection is the use of 
Silicon on Insulator (SOI) substrate shown in Figure 8 [50]. In this technology, the active device is 
fabricated in a thin silicon layer that is dielectrically isolated from the substrate. Therefore, the 
collection volume is reduced. The source and drain penetrate all the way to the buried isolation oxide 
in a typical thin-film SOI. Since the reverse-biased drain junction area is limited to the depletion 
region between the drain and the body of the transistor, this significantly reduces the area sensitive to 
SEUs. Due to the dielectric isolation in the SOI substrate, charge deposited in the silicon substrate 
underneath the buried isolation oxide cannot be colle ted at the drain. As opposed to the SOI 
substrate, the bulk silicon structure can collect charge from deep within the silicon substrate. 
 
 
Figure 8 Structure of thin-film NMOS SOI [51]  
 
It should be noted that bipolar capacitive coupling across the buried isolation oxide can lead to 
unexpected charge collection in SOI structures [52][53]. Charge deposited in the body region can 
trigger a bipolar mechanism (the parasitic lateral bipolar structure is inherent in all CMOS 
technologies [50]). This limits the SEU resistance of the SOI substrate [50, 51].  In order to reduce 
floating-body effects causing parasitic bipolar effects, careful body ties are used to maintain 
resistance against SEUs [50][54][55]. However, manuf ct rers have found even body-tied SOI 
substrates are not sufficiently resistant against SEUs for applications where very high upset limits are
desired [52][56][57]. In some cases, fully depleted SOI transistors exhibit reduced floating-body 
effects. 
Techniques at the fabrication process level provide a limited path to mitigate soft errors. Due to the 
invasive nature of these mitigation methods, which require fundamental changes in the manufacturing 
process, these low level methods usually come at the expense of additional process complexity and 
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steps, increased yield loss, or substrate cost [7]. Consequently, methods to increase soft error 
resistance at higher levels have been an alternative path to the fabrication process level techniques. 
3.2 Circuit and System Level Techniques to Tackle S oft Errors 
As opposed to mitigation methods at the fabrication process level, circuit and system level soft 
error mitigation techniques can provide portability across different fabrication processes. In addition 
to that, these higher level techniques could reduce the gap that exists between the state of the art 
fabrication technology and soft error sensitivity.  
Before discussing mitigation techniques for various storage elements it is important to note that 
there should be proper choice of circuit types in a design to decrease its sensitivity to soft errors. 
Thus, elements that are known to be vulnerable to soft errors should be eliminated. For instance, 
compared with static CMOS circuitry, dynamic logic (clock signal is used to precharge the output in 
the precharge phase while the pull-down network can discharge the output in the evaluate phase [58]) 
due to its passive and highly charge-sensitive mode of operation is vulnerable to soft errors; therefo 
it should not be used [59]. 
DRAM cells used to be sensitive to soft errors when manufacturers used planar capacitor cells that 
stored the signal charge in 2D, large-area junctions, because these cells were very efficient at 
collecting radiation induced charge. This issue was later addressed by developing 3D capacitor 
designs that significantly increase critQ  while greatly reducing junction collection efficiency by 
eliminating the large storage junction in silicon. Charge collection decreases by decreasing the 
junction’s volume, whereas the cell capacitance remains relatively constant with scaling because it is
dominated by the external 3D capacitor cell. 
One mitigation technique for SEUs in an SRAM cell is to increase the gate capacitance or 
interconnect capacitance of its storage nodes, since critQ  is proportional to nodeC  (node capacitance) 
and nodeV  (node voltage) as shown in Equation 6. As illustrated in Figure 9, parasitic capacitance 
between the interconnect metal layers (CA and CB) are used in [60] to add extra capacitance to the 
storage nodes to increase resistance against SEUs. 
 
 crit node nodeQ C V∝  (6) 





Figure 9 Capacitors CA and CB added to SRAM cell mitigate SEUs [60] 
Researchers in [61] proposed an area efficient design shown in Figure 10 to add capacitance (CC ) 
in the SRAM cell. In this design, cross couple capacitance is fabricated by 2 local interconnects. This 
design provides 20% reduction in area compared to the conventional SRAM cell. 
 
 
Figure 10 Capacitance CC  added in SRAM cell [61] 
 
Vertical metal-insulator-metal capacitors are used by ST Microelectronics to add extra capacitance 
to storage nodes [62]. These capacitors are added in l vels where there is no SRAM interconnect (the 
unused space above SRAM cells are used). Therefore, they do not change the SRAM cell and its area. 
However, there is an area penalty to route over SRAM. 
Another method to mitigate SEUs is to insert resistors in the feedback loop of an SRAM cell. This 
increases the RC time constant of the cell. The increased RC time constant potentially allows the cell 
to recover from an SEU. Researchers in [63] add 2 extra resistors 1R  and 2R , illustrated in Figure 
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11, to increase 1 1R C  and 2 2R C  time constants. As opposed to the mainstream six-transistor CMOS 
SRAM cell, shown in Figure 4, there are no direct connections between the input and output of the 
inverters shown in Figure 11. High-ohmic resistors 1R  and 2R  slow down the voltage transition on 
the input of inverters of the SRAM cell in Figure 11. For instance, if there is a current spike on node 
A , due to a high-energy particle hitting node A , it takes time for the disturbance to reach inverter 
1 3Q Q− . If this time is longer than the recovery time of n de A  the SRAM cell will not be flipped 
by the high-energy particle strike. In conclusion, if the recovery time of the output of the inverter is 
shorter than the RC time constant of the cell a bit flip does not happen. 
 
 
Figure 11 Increased RC time constant by adding 1R  and 2R  in feedback loop of SRAM cell [63] 
 
Increasing the resistors in a feedback loop inevitably increases the write time of an SRAM cell. 
However, in some cases, the increased write time might not be significantly important and can be 
tolerated. For example, in FPGA SRAM cells are used mainly in the read mode and are usually 
written once during the FPGA configuration. In addition to the write time penalty, there is increased 
process complexity incurred by adding feedback resistors [11]. 
Another important method to mitigate SEUs is by using redundant transistors to build memory cells 
or latches. These designs are different from mainstream storage elements built without considering 
resistance against SEUs. Unlike the typical SRAM cell with 6 transistors, researchers in [64] 
proposed an SRAM cell, depicted in Figure 12, with 10 transistors. As opposed to the positive 
feedback of the mainstream SRAM cell with 6 transistors, the negative feedback of the design 
suggested in [64] prevents flipping of the SRAM cell when there is a glitch at a node due to a high-
energy particle strike. 





Figure 12 Soft error robust SRAM cell using 10 transistors [64] 
 
One technique used at the circuit or system level to mitigate soft errors is based on time 
redundancy (also known as time multiplexing, temporal redundancy, and temporal parallelism) [4]. In 
this technique, data is sampled at different clock edges shifted relative to the global clock according 
to a clocking scheme to mitigate SETs. The effectivness of the temporal parallelism scheme is based 
on the fact that the likelihood of 2 independent errors occurring in the same circuit path within a small 
period of time is extremely low. For instance, as is illustrated in Figure 13, time redundancy is used to 
detect errors due to glitches (SETs) in combinationl logic or SEUs occurring in flip-flops [4]. 
 
 
Figure 13 SET error detection using time redundancy [4] 
 
Another method to tackle soft errors at the circuit or system level is based on the hardware modular 
redundancy (also known as spatial redundancy). In this method, 2 or more identical hardware 
modules are typically used to detect or further correct errors. Error detection by using Double 
Modular Redundancy (DMR) is shown in Figure 14. A mis atch in the output data detected in a 
DMR system will result in a restart of the system. 





Figure 14 Error detection by DMR 
 
As depicted in Figure 15, Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) is used for single error correction at 
the circuit or system level. In TMR, 3 identical copies computing the same input are connected to a 
majority voter. A majority voter is used to identify which of the outputs provide the correct data. The 
error is ignored in favor of the majority that supplies the correct output. Therefore, the correct output 
appears as the final result of the computation. 
 
 
Figure 15 Error correction by TMR 
 
In general, the downside to a circuit or system using hardware modular redundancy discussed 
above is the extra area, power, latency, and delay which is inherent to redundant schemes. For 
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instance, the TMR scheme shown in Figure 15 consume approximately triple the chip area in 
addition to the majority voter logic. 
As illustrated in Figure 16, the TMR method is used in register cells in LEON3-FT-RTAX (a fault 
tolerant FPGA-based microprocessor) to enhance resistance against soft errors [65]. If one of the 
latches is hit by a high-energy particle and starts to change state, the voter gate with the other 2 
latches prevents the change from feeding back and permanently being latched. Layout of this circuit 
is done in such a way to ensure a single ion strike could not affect more than one latch, and thus 




Figure 16 Register cell in LEON3-FT-RTAX using TMR [65] 
 
Figure 17 shows a simplified generic view of the technique that uses both the spatial and temporal 
redundancy in flip-flops [66]. The spatial parallelism technique uses multiple memory cells to protect 
against SEUs. The spatial and temporal parallelism technique proposed in [66] mitigates SEUs and 
SETs in combinatorial logic, global clock, and global control lines. This method comes at the cost of 









Figure 17 Spatial and temporal redundancy [66] 
 
At the system level, one of the most effective methods in dealing with soft errors in memory 
components is to use error detection and correction odes. Error detection and correction codes add a 
certain degree of redundancy to the system, and therefor  affect performance and occupy additional 
area. The choice of a detection or correction code is generally based on the nature of faults and 
required fault tolerance of the system. The choice f rror detecting code in this project is discussed 
later in this section. 
The parity code is the simplest error detection (but not an error correction) code. It adds an extra 
bit, the parity bit, to the data word (the actual information part in a word) so that the number of  ‘1’s 
in the codeword (data word plus parity bit) becomes even in case of  the even parity or odd in case of 
the odd parity. The obvious advantage of the parity code is its simplicity; and thus potentially 
minimal hardware overhead with just having 1 redundant parity bit in the whole codeword. 
The parity code is effective in detecting an odd number of errors in a data word and the parity bit 
(codeword). However, the generated error vector does not locate which bit or bits have been 
corrupted. When the number of corrupted bits in a codeword is even, the parity bit is still valid and 
the parity bit is not able to flag the error. Therefo , cases where an even number of bits get corrupted 
in a codeword are not detected by the parity code.  
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As shown in Figure 18, the parity error detection is generally used to detect single errors in an 
output register. The parity bit for the output register is predicted in parallel with the computation of 
the output. Then the predicted parity is compared with the real output parity to detect any single error 
in the output register and set the error flag.  
 
 
Figure 18 Parity error detection 
 
As opposed to the parity code, the error correction c des (e.g., the Hamming code [67]) add 
additional redundant bits (check bits) that enable unique error syndromes to be generated. These 
unique error syndromes can locate the position of corrupted bits. The overhead of encoding to 
generate the check bits should be considered since this overhead can be high. The redundant hardware 
should be less than TMR to make the error detection and correction code a reasonable choice. 
Error detection and correction codes provide an alternative to methods based on hardware modular 
redundancy since they (e.g., TMR and DMR) are usually expensive in terms of hardware cost and 
power consumption.  
Depending on the nature of errors, the degree of robustness that these expensive hardware modular 
redundancy schemes provide can be higher than what is really needed. For instance, DMR provides 
error detection for multiple bits. In case of soft errors where an error is random in time and space, the 
likelihood of multiple errors in 1 clock cycle is exceedingly low. Therefore, in this scenario, a less 
expensive approach such as the parity error detection ould suffice. It is important to investigate th 
capability of the parity scheme in detecting single errors on a specific platform to understand to what 
extent it is able to detect single errors. 
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3.3 Tackling Soft Errors by Architectural Methods  
When there are storage elements in a system, soft err rs can become an issue in reliability. In a 
microprocessor system, as shown in Figure 19, memory elements include registers known as register 
file, caches at different levels, main memory, and so on. Memories that are closer to a microprocessor 
are typically SRAM-based memories which are faster (have a shorter access time), smaller sized, and 
more expensive. The main memory is typically a DRAM-based memory that is less expensive with a 
longer access time.  
 
 
Figure 19 Memory hierarchy in a typical microprocessor system [13] 
 
The connection amongst different levels of memory system in a microprocessor is shown in Figure 
20. On a cache miss, data is typically provided by the next higher level (farther from the 
microprocessor) memory with longer access time in the hierarchy. An error in one memory level can 
propagate to other levels when a miss happens and corrupted data is copied to another level. 
In order to mitigate SETs (glitches) propagating to registers, the time redundancy technique (refer 
to Section 3.2) to monitor combinational results by using a sequential design is proposed in [68].  
This approach is then implemented in [69] to protect combinational logic of operations in the 
Arithmetic and Logic Unit (ALU). Researchers in [69] use the TMR technique to protect the register 
file against soft errors. 
 





Figure 20 Memory elements in Software-based system 
 
Cache lines that have not been used for a long time (dead cache lines) are used to hold replicas of 
lines that are used frequently (hot cache lines) in [70].  This approach can potentially increase the 
cache miss rate and decrease performance. It also depen s on how many cache lines are used 
infrequently in a program so that they can be used for replicas. 
Another approach that is proposed in [71] is software cache flushing. In this technique, the 
operating system flushes the entire cache periodically to remove errors. This affects performance due 
to the overhead of write-back and cache misses. 
It is shown in [72] that vulnerability of a level 1 cache to SEUs is reduced by using a write-through 
policy rather than write-back policy. The reduction n vulnerability, in a write-through policy, is due 
to immediate updating of the next level cache. In awrite-back, as opposed to a write-through policy, a 
cache line is not updated in the next level or main memory until the line needs to be replaced. 
Therefore, a cache line that resides longer in the cache is more likely to be affected by an SEU and 
propagate the error to the next level cache or main emory. Researchers in [73] proposed a technique 
that can be applied to a write-through cache to remove errors in a cache refetching. This technique 
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refetches cache lines from the next level cache or main memory to refresh cache lines. This basically 
reduces the residency of cache lines to increase the cache reliability.  
LEON3-FT-RTAX is a fault tolerant FPGA-based micropr cessor [74]. Figure 21 depicts the 
hardware components of this microprocessor. The combinational logic of LEON3-FT-RTAX is 
implemented in an antifuse FPGA which is RTAX-2000S. Unlike SRAM based FPGAs with SRAM 
cells controlling routing, this type of non-volatile FPGA has metal-to-metal antifuse programmable 
interconnect elements. Antifuses are normally open circuit and are programmed form a permanent, 
passive, and low impedance connection. 
 
 
Figure 21 Hardware components in LEON3 microprocessor [74] 
 
 As opposed to SRAM cells, the downside of antifuse el ments is that they are one-time 
programmable. On the other hand, their advantage is that they are not vulnerable to SEUs. Flip-Flops 
in this microprocessor are hardened (made more tolerant against errors) by using TMR on the FPGA 
(RTAX-2000S). Each TMR D flip-flop (shown in Figure 16) consists of 3 master-slave latch pairs, 
each with asynchronous self-correcting feedback paths. 
There are different options, shown in Table 3.1, for error detection and correction of the register 
file in LEON3-FT-RTAX to mitigate soft errors. The desired option can be selected during synthesis. 
As discussed before in Section 3.2, these techniques add overhead to the system. For instance, the 
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correction in the 3rd and 5th rows of Table 3.1 takes 6 clock cycles. An uncorrectable error in the 
register file causes a trap. 
 
Table 3.1 Error detection and correction in register fil  [74] 
Error detection and 
correction technique Description 
Hardened flip-flops or 
TMR 
Register file implemented with SEU hardened flip-flops. No error 
checking. 
4-bit parity with restart 
4-bit checksum per 32-bit word. Detects and corrects 1 bit per byte (4 bits 
per word) through restart. 
8-bit parity without 
restart 
8-bit checksum per 32-bit word. Detects and corrects 1 bit per byte (4 bits 
per word). Correction on-the-fly without pipeline rstart. 
7-bit BCH with restart 
7-bit BCH checksum per 32-bit word. Detects 2 bits and corrects 1 bit per 
word. Pipeline restart on correction. 
 
Each word in the cache tag or data memories has 4 check bits. An error during a cache access will 
cause a cache line flush, and a re-execution of the ailing instruction. This will insure that the entire 
cache line (tag plus data) is refilled from external memory. 
3.4 Soft Errors in FPGA vs. ASIC 
This section presents the peculiar effects of soft errors in FPGAs and how these effects are different 
in FPGA vs. ASIC.  
The effect of SETs are similar in an ASIC or FPGA. An SET (equivalent to a glitch) might 
propagate through the combinational logic up to a flip-flop. Depending on the timing of the glitch 
relative to the clock edge it might get stored and replace the valid data, or it might not have any effect 
at all. An error caused by an SET is not permanent in the sense that the implementation itself is not 
affected in terms of functionality and resetting the system will bring it back to its expected initial 
state. 
An SEU occurring in sequential elements or flip-flops affects both FPGA and ASIC in a similar 
way. Due to an SEU the value of a flip-flop flips. Then at the next clock edge the new data is stored. 
Therefore, the affect is not permanent and the imple entation is functionally correct after a reset.  
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Unlike ASICs, an SEU has a peculiar effect in FPGAs when it hits the combinational logic. Since 
the combinational logic in an ASIC does not have any storage elements SEUs can only affect flip-
flops. On the other hand, combinational logic in an FPGA is thoroughly controlled by SRAM cells 
(e.g., SRAM cells control LUTs in the combinational logic). The memory cells of a LUT 
(combinational logic) can be affected by an SEU in the same way that flip-flops (sequential logic) are 
affected. For instance, in Figure 22(a), an SEU can hange the function that is stored in SRAM 
memory cells of the LUT.  This error in an SRAM cell is not transient, meaning that it will not 
resolve at the next clock edge.  It will only resolve when the FPGA is reconfigured. Consequently, 
this changes the functionality of the function implemented in the LUT. As observed, the whole 
combinational logic of an implementation on FPGA is vulnerable to SEUs that can cause non-
transient errors.  
 
 
Figure 22 Combinational logic on FPGA vs. ASIC (a) function implemented in LUT on FPGA, (b) 
function implemented using gates on ASIC 
 
It is important to note that the routing in an FPGA is also controlled by SRAM cells.  These SRAM 
cells control pass transistors, multiplexers and tri-state buffers. Therefore, in addition to 
combinational logic, routing is vulnerable to SEUs.  Thus, it is crucial to investigate the effectiveness 
of an error detecting scheme on FPGA with respect to this peculiar effect of SEUs in combinational 
logic and routing on FPGA. 
In this research, the parity error detection on FPGA is thoroughly investigated and its weaknesses 
are found. Other than fabrication process level methods to tackle soft errors, some of the mitigation 
techniques such as a parity or Hamming code are used in FPGAs just as in ASICs. These techniques 
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do not cover errors in SRAM cells controlling logic blocks and routing of FPGAs.  Techniques to 
eliminate these weaknesses are proposed (refer to Chapter 5). Therefore, the error coverage of the 
parity scheme is expanded to soft errors in combinatio l logic as well as routing on FPGA. 
It is important to note that concurrent error correction techniques, e.g., the Hamming code in [75] 
and TMR can potentially lose their correction capability over time in an FPGA implementation. The 
reason behind this is the potential change in the functionality of the correction technique 
implemented. For example, SEUs can hit the SRAM bits defining the voter functionality of a TMR 
based design or the error correction circuitry of the Hamming code. In addition to that, there is 
accumulation of errors due to SEUs. The only way to remove these errors in SRAM cells of 
combinational logic and routing is to reconfigure the FPGA. If these errors are not removed by 
reconfiguration the dependability of a correction technique that a system has relied on is questionable. 
The necessity of reconfiguration to remove SEUs in SRAM-based FPGAs was mentioned in [4]. 
3.5 Summary 
The main goal of this chapter was to present previous techniques to tackle soft errors at different 
levels. At the lowest level, fabrication process-baed techniques have been used. These low level 
techniques can affect the fabrication process complexity and steps, increase yield loss, or substrate 
cost [7]. Additionally, they may not be portable across different fabrication processes. Soft error 
mitigation techniques at higher levels (circuit and system levels) provide portability and can eliminate 
the gap between the state of the art fabrication technology and soft error sensitivity. At the circuit and 
fabrication process-based levels, the main goal is to increase critQ  while maintaining or reducing 
collQ  to improve resistance against soft errors. 
At the system level, spatial or temporal redundancies are used to tackle soft errors. Since the 
likelihood of 2 independent errors in the same circuit path within a small period of time is extremely 
low, data is sampled at different clock edges to detect SETs in temporal redundancy. Spatial 
redundancy is used in error detection and correction c des or in hardware modular redundancy 
techniques such as DMR and TMR to detect and correct e rors, respectively.  
Peculiar effects of SEUs in FPGA in the combinational logic and routing were discussed in this 
chapter. These effects do not happen in ASIC. Since the combinational logic and routing on ASIC do 
not have any storage elements, SEUs can only affect flip-flops. On the other hand, the combinational 
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logic and routing on FPGA is thoroughly controlled by SRAM cells (e.g., SRAM cells control LUTs 
in the combinational logic and pass transistors in routing). 
In summary, previous research using the parity code [76][77][78] or Hamming code [75] for AES 
have not analyzed the underlying routing or logic of an SRAM-based FPGA implementation. 
Selecting a system level mitigation technique according to available resources and mathematical 
properties of a specific operation is also not considered in classic techniques such as TMR and DMR. 
Radiation hardened FPGAs typically use fabrication, circuit, or system level mitigation techniques 
(for instance, Virtex-4QV uses a thin epitaxial layer in wafer manufacturing [49] and flip-flops are 
designed using TMR in LEON3-FT-RTAX [74]) that are independent of the application 
implementation and possibly introduce redundancy in unused resources. 
In the next chapter, security requirements of a system are briefly described. Then the primitives to 
provide these security needs are presented. Emphasis is put on symmetric-key algorithm AES that is 
the focus in this research. NIST-recommended block cipher modes are also covered briefly. Error 
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Chapter 4 
Security Needs of Data Systems 
This chapter briefly describes the general security requirements of a system such as authentication, 
data confidentiality, data integrity, and non-repudiation. Then it describes the primitives for providing 
these security needs. Emphasis is placed on standard symmetric-key algorithms, such as AES 
described in section 3.1.1. Block cipher modes (suggested by NIST) which can be used with AES are 
also covered briefly. The AES error propagation in these modes is discussed. Previous approaches in 
implementing AES are provided at the end of this chapter.  
4.1 Security Needs and Cryptographic Algorithms 
In general, the security services to be provided for a system include authentication, access control, 
data confidentiality, data integrity, and non-repudiation [79]. The following presents a brief definiton 
of each security service [80]. 
 Authentication is the assurance that the identities n a communication are the ones they 
claim to be. 
 Data confidentiality is the protection of data from being disclosed by unauthorized parties. 
The protection could even include any information about the data traffic flow. 
 Data integrity is the assurance that the received data has not been replayed or affected by 
modification, insertion, or deletion. 
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 Non-repudiation prevents against denial by an authorized party involved of having 
participated in a communication. 
The basic types of cryptographic algorithms (primitives) that provide a means for the above 
security services are symmetric-key algorithms, public-key algorithms, and hash functions. These 
primitives are introduced briefly as follows [81][82]. 
 In the classical model of cryptography, a symmetric-key (also known as conventional or 
single-key) cryptographic algorithm encrypts plaintext into ciphertext using a secret key. 
The decryption algorithm uses the same secret key to transform the ciphertext to plaintext. 
Symmetric-key encryptions are typically used for confidentiality. They are also used in 
common keyed hash functions to provide data integrity and authentication. 
 As opposed to a symmetric-key algorithm, a public-key algorithm uses 2 different keys 
(public and private keys) for encryption and decryption. For example, a public key is used 
to encrypt plaintext to produce ciphertext. The corresponding private key is then used to 
decrypt the ciphertext and recover the plaintext. It should be computationally infeasible to 
find the decryption rule from the encryption rule in a public-key cryptosystem. Public-key 
algorithms are typically used in security protocols for authentication. They are also used 
for generating and verifying digital signatures to provide non-repudiation and for 
exchanging keys in a symmetric-key cryptosystem. 
 A hash function is a transformation that takes a variable-sized input data (message) and 
returns a fixed-size output (message digest also known as hash value). It should be 
relatively easy to compute the hash value for any message. On the other hand, it should be 
computationally infeasible to compute the message from the hash value. The problem of 
finding 2 messages having the same hash value should also be difficult to solve. Unkeyed 
hash functions provide data integrity, while keyed hash functions are used for data integrity 
and authentication. Another common use of hash functio s is in signature schemes. In this 
case, the hash value of a message is computed first, and then the hash value is signed using 
a signature scheme. 
In a symmetric-key cryptosystem, it is required that t e 2 parties have already established a shared 
secret key between themselves in a secure manner before any ciphertext is transmitted. In a public-
key cryptosystem the prior communication of a shared s cret key is not needed. However, it should 
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be computationally infeasible to determine the private key given the public key. The idea behind 
public-key cryptography was introduced by Diffie and Hellman in 1976. 
Most public-key algorithms have larger key sizes (denoted k) than symmetric algorithms; Table 4.1 
shows a comparison of security strengths and lifetim s among RSA (a public-key algorithm), AES, 
2TDEA (triple Data Encryption Standard (DES) symmetric-key algorithm with 2 independent keys), 
and 3TDEA (triple DES with 3 independent and different keys). Security strength, which is specified 
in bits, is a number associated with the amount of w rk (that is the number of operations) that is 
required to break a cryptographic algorithm or system [83]. It should be noted that the number of bits
of security strength is not necessarily the same as the key sizes for the algorithms, due to attacks on 
algorithms that provide an attacker with computational advantages. In general, symmetric algorithms 
are faster and more efficient with respect to impleentation and performance. However, they need 
secure establishment of a secret key; public-key algorithms can be used to provide a cryptosystem 
with the secure key establishment. 
 









Through 2010 80 k=1024 2TDEA 
Through 2030 112 k=2048 3TDEA 
Through 2030 128 k=3072 AES, k=128 
Through 2030 192 k=7680 AES, k=192 
Through 2030 256 k=15360 AES, k=256 
 
A symmetric-key block cipher is a very important primitive in encryption/decryption, key transport 
for establishing session keys and keyed hash functions. The NIST standardized symmetric-key block 
cipher AES, which has been predicted to be secure well beyond 20-30 years, are discussed in the next 
section. Block cipher modes as well as how they provide confidentiality and integrity services and the
error propagation issue related to the modes are also discussed in Section 4.2. 
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4.1.1  Advanced Encryption Standard 
With technology rapidly advancing, DES, which uses a 56-bit key, was broken in 1999 in less than 
22 hours [84] by brute force attack. Therefore, a robust new standard was needed to replace the aging 
DES which had been developed in the 1970s. In September 1997, NIST launched a worldwide call 
for submission of publicly disclosed encryption algorithms worldwide for the AES selection [85]; 15 
candidate algorithms were submitted. After 3 publicly held conferences to discuss and analyze the 
candidates, the competition field narrowed down to five competitors. Finally, in 2000, Rijndael was 
named as the AES algorithm, the winner of the 3-year competition involving some of the world’s 
leading cryptographers. In March 2008, due to the comprehensive investigation on AES and focus on 
its usage, Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) proposed to adopt AES as the 
standard encryption algorithm for space application [86]. 
AES is based on the ideas of Shannon and the concepts of diffusion and confusion. Whilst most 
block ciphers follow these principles, few do so as clearly as AES that is said to be a substitution 
permutation (SP)-network [81]. Diffusion is intended to spread out the influence of all the bits of 
inputs, namely plaintext and key, to all the bits in ciphertext. Diffusion is provided in AES by the use 
of ShiftRows and MixColumns [87]. The goal of confusion is to make the relationship between 
ciphertext and a key and plaintext as complex as pos ible. In AES, confusion is provided by a very 
carefully chosen substitution transformation (referred to as SubBytes). SubBytes is the most complex 
and the only nonlinear operation of AES due to the multiplicative inversion it contains [87]; 
nonlinearity ensures a low correlation between input bits and output bits. The SubBytes 
transformation is designed in such a way that makes it r istant against linear and differential attacks, 
as well as interpolation attacks [88]. The SubBytes output is then spread by diffusion in each round. 
AES supports 3 key sizes (i.e. 128, 192, and 256 bits) and has the fixed block size of 128 bits. The 
algorithm consists of a number of rounds depending o  the key size as shown in Table 4.2. The 
encryption and decryption algorithm for the key size of 128 bits is depicted in Figure 23. Each round 
consists of four transformations, which are described elow, except for the last round which includes 
only 3 operations. The AES key expansion algorithm akes the input key and generates 128-bit round 
keys for each round. A 128-bit data block is handled in a 4x4 matrix in which each element of the 
matrix is an 8-bit element; this matrix is referred to as the state. 
 




Table 4.2 AES parameters 
Key size in bits Block size in bits Number of rounds 
128 128 10 
192 128 12 
256 128 14 
 
 
Figure 23 AES algorithm 
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A Galois Field (GF ) is a field that contains a finite number of elements and the order of the field 
is mp  where p  is a prime number and 1m ≥  is an integer [82]. This field is denoted ( )mGF p . A 
commonly used representation for the elements in ( )mGF p  is the polynomial based representation 
which is shown as follows in Equation (7). 
 
 1 21 2 1 0( ) { | {0,1, . 1}}
m m m
m m iGF p a x a x a x a a p
− −
− −= + + + + ∈ −… …  (7) 
 
Addition and multiplication of polynomials is preformed modulo ( )m x  where ( )m x  is an 
irreducible polynomial of degree m . An 8-bit element, b , of a state in AES is an elements in 
8(2 )GF ; b  can be represented as follows in the polynomial form. 
 
 7 6 5 4 3 27 6 5 4 3 2 1 0; {0,1}ib b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b where b= + + + + + + + ∈  (8) 
 
 The SubBytes transformation, as shown in Equation (9), computes th  affine transformation 
on multiplicative inverse 1b−  of an 8-bit input b  in 8(2 )GF  with the corresponding 
irreducible polynomial being 8 4 3( ) 1m x x x x x= + + + + . Equation (10) shows 
SubBytes where the affine transformation is done on the 8-bit multiplicative inverse 
element, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 17 6 5 4 3 2 1 0[ ]
Tb b b b b b b b b− − − − − − − − −=  in the matrix form. SubBytes is the 
only nonlinear transformation in AES due to the multiplicative inversion it contains. The 8-
bit elements b  and 1b−  have an inverse relationship in which 1 1 mod ( )bb m x− = . 
The affine transformation is multiplication by a constant matrix, M , and an addition with 
a constant 16(63)C =  as shown in Equation (10). Note that a single-bit multiplication is 
an AND, and a single-bit addition is an XOR in the Galois field. 
 
 1 1( ) ( ); ( )SubBytes b affine b where b inverse b− −= =  (9) 
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 The mix columns transformation (referred to as MixColumns) is a function on each column 
of the state that outputs a corresponding column (four 8-bit elements). Given a column of 
the state [ ]Ta b c d  in which elements are in 8(2 )GF  where 
8 4 3( ) 1m x x x x x= + + + + , the MixColumns transformations is multiplication by 
polynomial 3 2{03} {01} {01} {02}x x x+ + +  modulo 4 1x + , as  it is shown in Equation 
(11). Equivalently, this can be done by a matrix multiplication as shown in Equation 12. 
 
 3 2 3 2 3 2 4' ' ' ' ( )({03} {01} {01} {02}) mod ( 1)d x c x b x a dx cx bx a x x x x+ + + = + + + + + + +  (11) 
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Figure 24 ShiftRows transformation in AES [80] 
 
 The shift rows transformation (referred to as ShiftRows) is an 8-bit circular left shift 
operation, as shown in Figure 24. The shift is done  each row of the state except for the 
first row. 
 In the add round key transformation (referred to as AddRoundKey), a round key is added to 
the state by a simple bitwise XOR operation. Each round key produced by the key 
expansion has the same structure as the state so each 8-bit element of the round key is 
XORed with the corresponding element of the state. 
4.2  Block Cipher Modes 
A block cipher mode of operation, or mode for short, is a technique for adapting a symmetric-key 
block cipher algorithm for an application and a message length to provide security services required. 
For instance, a mode can feature the use of a symmetric-k y block cipher algorithm to provide a 
security service, such as confidentiality or authenication. 
NIST has approved 8 modes for block ciphers in a serie  of special publications [89]. Currently, 
there are 5 confidentiality modes (electronic codebook, cipher block chaining, output feedback, cipher 
feedback, and counter modes), 1 authentication mode (cipher-based message authentication code 
mode), and 2 combined modes for confidentiality and uthentication (counter with cipher block 
chaining-message authentication code and Galois/counter modes).  
This section describes some of the modes briefly in order to point out how the structure of different 
modes affects their sensitivity to errors. In the figures that follow, plaintext blocks, ciphertext blocks 
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and a symmetric key are denoted as 1 2{ , , , }NP P P… , 1 2{ , , , }NC C C…  and K , respectively. 
Plaintext must be a sequence of one or more complete data blocks. In other words, the total number of 
bits in the plaintext must be a multiple of the block size. If the data string to be encrypted does not 
initially satisfy this property, then the formatting of the plaintext must entail an increase in the 
number of bits. A common way to achieve the necessary increase in length is to append some extra 
bits, called padding. One example of a padding method is to append a single bit ‘1’ to the data string 
and then append as few ‘0’ bits necessary, possibly none, to complete the final block. 
4.2.1 Confidentiality Modes 
Three of the confidentiality modes are outlined in this section. The error propagation issue with 
respect to the structure of the modes is also discussed. 
The electronic codebook (referred to as ECB) mode is a confidentiality mode that has the simplest 
structure, as depicted in Figure 25. In the ECB encryption, the cipher encryption is applied directly 
and independently to each block of the plaintext. The resulting sequence of output is the ciphertext 
blocks. In the decryption, the decryption function s applied directly and independently to each block 
of the ciphertext. The resulting sequence of output decrypted is the plaintext blocks. 
 
 
Figure 25 Electronic codebook (ECB) mode [80] 
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In both ECB encryption and decryption, multiple cipher encryptions and decryptions can be 
computed in parallel. In this mode, under a given ky, the same plaintext block always gets encrypted 
to the same ciphertext block. This property called pattern identification might be undesirable in some 
particular applications. For instance, when a message is highly structured it may be possible for an 
attacker to exploit theses regularities. To overcome this issue, other modes propose the chaining of 
encryption/decryption blocks in which there is a connection from the output of one 
encryption/decryption to the input of the subsequent encryption/decryption. 
The encryption in cipher block chaining (referred to as CBC) mode features the chaining of the 
plaintext blocks with the previous ciphertext block as illustrated in Figure 26. It requires an 
Initialization Vector (IV) to XOR with the first input plaintext block. The IV, which is an additional 
input block, does not have to be secret but it must be unpredictable. As opposed to ECB, the same 
plaintext/ciphertext block if repeated generates a different ciphertext/plaintext block in CBC. This i 
due to fact that in CBC the ciphertext/plaintext block depends on not only the plaintext/ciphertext 
block but also the results of the previous encryptions/decryptions. However, the drawback is that the 
encryption/decryption cannot be performed in parallel. 
 
 
Figure 26 Cipher block chaining (CBC) mode [80] 
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The Counter (referred to as CTR) mode provides the capability of parallel performance. Figure 27 
depicts the CTR mode. The counter value, which is the same size as the plaintext block, should be 
different for each plaintext that is encrypted. Therefore, repetitive ciphertext blocks corresponding to 
the same plaintext block cannot be recognized. The CTR mode requires only the implementation of 
the encryption and not the decryption. 
 
 
Figure 27 Counter (CTR) mode [80] 
 
In general, modes that have the chaining of an encryption/decryption to the preceding encryption 
/decryption have the issue of propagating errors through the ciphertext/plaintext blocks (this is known 
as infinite error propagation). The modes that have this chaining structure are CBC, Output Feedback 
(OFB [89]) and Cipher Feedback (CFB [89]). On the other hand, ECB and CTR, which do not have 
this chaining structure, isolate errors within the corresponding block.  
A single bit flip in the early rounds of AES encryption is expected to result in 50% erroneous bits 
in the output [76]. This shows a good diffusion in the AES algorithm. Diffusion is a desirable 
property from a cryptographic point of view and makes a strong symmetric-key algorithm; however it 
becomes an issue in error propagation. This problem is even worse in CBC, OFB and CFB modes 
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since a single bit error leads up to erroneous subsequent ciphertext/plaintext blocks which is 
dramatically different from the expected result. 
4.2.2 Authentication Mode 
NIST has recommended a cipher-based message authenticatio  code (referred to as CMAC) 
algorithm that is based on a symmetric-key algorithm such as AES. CMAC is designed to detect 
intentional, unauthorized modifications of the data s well as accidental modifications. Figure 28 
depicts the MAC generation in CMAC. The message is divided into a sequence of bit strings 
*
1 2{ , , }nM M M… , in which they all have the block size of 128 for AES except for the very last 
string *nM  that might have a smaller size. The 2 keys 1 2{ , }K K  are generated by the subkey 
generation (provided in [90]) by using the symmetric-key algorithm. CMAC has 2 parts illustrated in 
Figure 28. The left side that uses 1K  is applied when 
*
nM  has the size of a block. Otherwise, the 
right side with 2K  is used, and a single ‘1’ bit followed by the appropriate number of ‘0’ bits are 
appended to *nM  to form a complete block. The same procedure is done at the destination to compute 
the MAC (T) which then compares it with the received MAC. Since an encryption is connected to the 
following encryption an error in any block propagates hrough the CMAC computation, finally it will 
affect the MAC (T). This shows the importance of detecting errors in all the encryption modules. 
 
 
Figure 28 Cipher-based message authentication code (CMAC) [90] 
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4.2.3 Authentication and Confidentiality Modes 
The 2 NIST-specified modes which provide both authentication and confidentiality are compared 
below in terms of their error propagation properties. The Galois/counter mode (referred to as GCM) 
provides authenticated encryption and authenticated decryption. It does not use the decryption module 
of the block cipher (e.g., AES). It encrypts the confidential data and computes an authentication tag 
on both confidential and non-confidential data. The confidentiality mechanism of GCM is a variation 
of the CTR mode. A particular incrementing function is specified [91] for generating the counter 
blocks in GCM. It also uses the block cipher (e.g., AES) for generating the authentication tag. Similar 
to the CTR mode, there is no connection between the ciphers; therefore the error is contained in its 
block in GCM. The authentication mechanism of GCM is provided by a hash function named 
GHASH which is multiplication by a fixed hash subkey [91]. 
The counter with cipher block chaining-message authentication code mode (referred to as CCM) 
provides authenticity of the confidential and non-confidential data and generates ciphertext for the 
confidential data [92]. It uses only the encryption of the symmetric-key algorithm (e.g., AES). The 
authentication mechanism of CCM uses CBC which has t e chaining structure in the block ciphers. 
As a result, an error spreads throughout the blocks. On the other hand, the confidentiality mechanism 
in CCM uses the CTR mode that isolates an error within s block. 
4.3 Previous Research on AES Design 
AES is a complex and computationally intensive algorithm. Therefore, it needs significant amount 
of hardware resources in implementation. Block memories and combinational logic have been used 
for the AES implementation. The amount of block memories vs. combinational logic varies 
significantly in different approaches in previous re earch. One approach that uses the largest memory 
space amongst previous research combines the SubBytes and MixColumns transformation in a block 
memory named T-table [93][80] . 
A T-table is constructed as follows. In Equation 13, 'a 'b , 'c , and 'd  are 8-bit elements of the 
state column in the MixColumns result, while a , b , c , and d  are 8-bit input elements to SubBytes.  
For simplicity, ShiftRows is not shown in Equation 13 since it does not need any logic resources. T-
tables 0 ( )T a , 1( )T b , 2 ( )T c , and 3 ( )T d  are defined in Equation 14 for each 8-bit element. 
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Each T-table in Equation 14 is a block memory of size 256x32-bit. In order to provide parallel 
memory accesses, 16 T-tables are needed.  It should be noted that the last round of AES does not 
include the MixColumns transformation. Therefore, SubBytes must be obtained from different tables 
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In approaches other than T-table, SubBytes and MixColumns are designed separately. The following 
2 sections present previous implementations of SubBytes and MixColumns of AES. 
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4.3.1  SubBytes implementations in AES  
The memory based SubBytes implementations [94-97] basically use a block memory t  store the 
results of this transformation. The SubBytes in the form of a block memory, known as an S-box, is 
given in Appendix F. Each 8-bit element of the state needs a 256x8-bit block memory for S-box. The 
size of an S-box is 25% of the T-table size (a T-table needs a block memory of size 256x32-bit).  In 
addition to providing simplicity, the fact that state of the art FPGAs provide built-in block memories 
makes the memory based implementation of SubBytes an attractive option for this transformation. 
However, it might not be suitable for a heavily pipel ned AES aiming to achieve the highest clock 
frequency and throughput.  
On the other hand, the SubBytes implemented thoroughly in combinational logic [98-104] can be 
heavily pipelined. However, implementation of SubBytes in the original Galois field, 8(2 )GF  with 
polynomial 8 4 3( ) 1P x x x x x= + + + + , is complex and uses significant number of hardware 
resources. Composite fields, briefly described as follows, have been suggested in previous research to 
reduce the complexity of operations in 8(2 )GF . The complexity indicates the cost of hardware 
resources used for implementation of operations in a Galois field. 
The complexity of various operations, such as multiplication and inversion depend on the chosen 
Galois field. Composite fields, first introduced in [105], were extensively studied in [106] to reduce 
the complexity of operations such as inversion in aGalois field. A composite field ((2 ) )n mGF  is 
isomorphic to the field (2 )kGF  where k m n= × . These 2 fields are of order 2m n× . However, their 
complexity may be different depending on the choice of m  , n  and the irreducible polynomials 
[106].  
Different composite fields for 8(2 )GF  have been suggested in [98-102][107] for implementation 
of AES. The composite field is applied to the whole SubBytes in [99, 100], whereas researchers in 
[98, 102, 107] use composite fields in only the inversion of SubBytes as illustrated in Figure 29. The 
constant multiplications in MixColumns are shown to be more expensive in composite fields in [102].  
Therefore, researchers in [102] concluded that the only operation that benefits from composite fields 
is the inversion of SubBytes, while the rest of the transformations are more effici nt in the original 
8(2 )GF .  





Figure 29 SubBytes with inversion in composite fields 
 
In Figure 29, symbols δ  and 1δ −  are the linear functions for isomorphic mapping of elements 
from one field to another. These mapping functions are matrix multiplication. First, an input b  is 
mapped from 8(2 )GF  to the corresponding element in the composite field by δ . Then the inversion 
is done in the composite field. The inversion result is then mapped from the composite field to the 
corresponding element in 8(2 )GF  by 1δ − . Finally, the SubBytes output is generated after applying 
the affine function. 
The overall picture of the inversion of SubBytes in composite field 4 2((2 ) )GF  is shown in Figure 
30. Aside from δ  and 1δ − , which are matrix multiplications, the other operations are in 4(2 )GF . 
These operations include square, XOR, multiplication, multiplication by a constant, and inversion. It 
should be noted that 4(2 )GF  can be further decomposed to compute any of these operations. 
 
 
Figure 30 Inversion of SubBytes in composite fields [102] 
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In 4 2((2 ) )GF , it is assumed the irreducible polynomial of degre 2 is of the form 
2( )P x x x A= + +  where A  in 4(2 )GF . The inverse of an element bx c+  denoted  px q+  is 
computed in Equation 15. Therefore, computing the inv rsion in 8(2 )GF  is translated to computing 
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 Different composite fields result in different costs in terms of usage of hardware resources. 
4 2((2 ) )GF , rather than 8(2 )GF , is used in [100] with the polynomials shown in Equation 16 for 
4(2 )GF  and 4 2((2 ) )GF . Symbol ω  is a generator of 4(2 )GF  with polynomial 
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As shown in Equation 17, 8(2 )GF  is decomposed into 4 2((2 ) )GF  in [99]. However, a different 
constant value ( (1000)β =  in binary vector form) from [100] is used for the polynomial of the 
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Unlike [99, 100], researchers in [107] use further d composition of 8(2 )GF  to 2 2 2(((2 ) ) )GF . 
The composite fields shown in Equation 18 are used in [107] for the inversion of SubBytes. Symbols 
φ  and  λ  are (10) and (1100) in binary vector notation, respectively. This inversion is pipelined in 
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8(2 )GF  is decomposed into 4 2((2 ) )GF  with polynomial 2( )P x x x β= + +  and constant 
(1100)β =  in [102]. The following equations were proposed to compute the 4-bit inversion in 
4(2 )GF . The 4-bit input and output of the inversion are 3 2 1 0( )x x x x  and 
' ' ' '
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As shown in Table 4.3, researchers in [102] provide a comparison of different inversion 
implementations in terms of number of gates on ASIC. The square-multiply approach is based on the 
Fermat’s theorem†. According to this comparison, the composite fields used in [102] have the least 
gate count and shortest critical path compared to others. 
 
                                                   
† Suppose p is a prime. If gcd( , ) 1a p = , then 1 1 modpa p− ≡ . 




Table 4.3 Gate counts and critical paths of SubBytes inversions in 4(2 )GF  [102] 
Total  # of gates Gates in critical path 
SubBytes inversions in 4(2 )GF  
XOR AND XOR AND 
Square-multiply approach 54 18 12 2 
[98, 107] 17 9 7 2 
[102] 14 9 3 2 
 
4.3.2 MixColumns implementations in AES 
Previous research on implementation of MixColumns is described in this section while the 
proposed MixColumns is described in Chapter 5 . Rearrangement of the MixColumns equation with 
respect to the structure of FPGA potentially results in a better optimized design in terms of utilizing 
hardware resources. Significant research [107-111] has been done on resource sharing between 
MixColumns and InvMixColumns; however, there is limited work on optimizing the MixColumns 
transformation on its own on FPGA. This can be applied directly in several modes (e.g., the NIST 
approved modes mentioned in Section 4.2) that do not need the decryption function.  
Researchers in [98, 102] suggested the MixColumns shown in Equation 20 where a bit position 
{0,1,..., 7}i ∈ . In the left column of this equation, 2 bytes are XORed and the multiplication by 
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Researchers in [112] suggested the original MixColumns shown in Equation 12. In this approach, 
( )xtime z  and ( )xtime z z+  are computed for each 8-bit element of the state column. There is also 
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Equation 21 used for MixColumns architecture in [108, 109]. These designs were all imp emented on 
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 (21) 
4.4 SEU-resistant AES 
The main system level techniques that have been used to tackle SEUs in an AES implementation 
are the parity [76][77][78] and Hamming code [75]. The parity bits for the S-box values are stored in 
the block memory to cover errors in the memory cells and an extra block memory is used to cover 
errors in the memory decoder [76][78] (refer to Section 6.3). In the AES using composite fields, the 
parity prediction is presented in [77]. The parity prediction for the MixColumns transformation is 
provided in [78]. The SubBytes in composite fields suggested in [102] and parity predictions in [77]   
are further discussed in Chapter 6 (see Table 6.3).The Hamming code for error correction of AES 
was suggested in [75] for space applications. 
The parity for S-box implemented using distributed RAMs was proposed in [113] for error 
detection. In [114], SubBytes in composite fields and its inverse were divided into blocks and the 
parities of these blocks were predicted.  
A 32-bit datapath for a compact ASIC implementation of AES was proposed in [115]. In order to 
provide error detection, S-boxes were duplicated an parity bits were used for other AES 
transformations. 
Researchers in [116] proposed a two-dimensional parity-based concurrent error detection method 
to detect errors in both horizontal and vertical direction in the data matrix for AES against differential 
fault attack (refer to Section 2.2.2). 
None of the above techniques consider the underlying SRAM cells in routing or logic in an FPGA 
implementation of AES. Reconfiguration of the FPGA to ensure correct functionality of the 
implementation after an SEU is also not considered. 




General security requirements of a system such as authentication, data confidentiality, data 
integrity, and non-repudiation were briefly described in this chapter. Then the primitives to provide 
these security needs (i.e. symmetric-key algorithms, public-key algorithms, and hash functions) were 
presented. Emphasis is placed on standard symmetric-k y algorithm AES in this research. 
Block cipher modes (recommended by NIST) which can be used with AES were also covered 
briefly. Error propagation of the AES algorithm due to confusion and diffusion properties was 
discussed. It has been shown that an error in the early rounds of AES encryption is expected to in 
50% erroneous bits in the output [76]. It was discus ed how the chaining structure in modes can 
further propagate errors throughout blocks. 
Different approaches in implementing AES were presented. This provides clarification for the 
experimental results and comparisons presented in Chapter 6. 
In summary, unlike previous AES implementations using the parity code [76][77][78] and 
Hamming code [75], the proposed design considers erors in the FPGA routing and logic. 
Considering the available resources on the FPGA, the dual ported block memory is suggested in this 
research for error detection in SubBytes as opposed to the parity coding in [76][77][78]. 
In the next chapter, the proposed AES implementation providing error detection is introduced. In 
the proposed error detection technique, some of the mathematical properties of AES and available 
hardware resources on FPGA are used to detect errors in SubBytes and the control circuitry 
implementations. Enhancements to the parity scheme (used for error detection in the MixColumns and 
AddRoundKey transformations) to increase its error coverage are also proposed in this research. In 
order to increase the error coverage of the parity technique, the weaknesses of it on FPGA are found. 
The enhancements are then discussed in 2 categories: combinational logic and routing. 
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Chapter 5 
Proposed AES with Error Detection 
The proposed error detection technique in AES detects rrors in both logic blocks and routing on 
FPGA. An important category of errors is soft errors caused by radiation affecting SRAM cells that 
build and control every aspect of FPGA implementation (refer to Section 2.1). Soft errors cause a 
single error in 1 clock cycle (the likelihood of multiple errors is extremely low). The error detection 
in this research is considered early in design as opposed to being an after part to AES. The proposed 
error detection technique based on the parity scheme xploits some of the AES algorithm algebraic 
characteristics. The weaknesses of the parity scheme used in previous research and mitigation 
techniques to provide the lowest cost adequate method in this research are described in this chapter.  
Error detection is investigated in 2 different categories: logic blocks and routing. First, the category 
of logic blocks is discussed. The proposed mapping of logic blocks on FPGA is examined thoroughly 
to ensure any single error is detected. Second, the category of routing is presented. A simple and yet 
accurate model for soft errors is verified and applied through experiments. This model is used to 
examine the routing of AES implemented on FPGA in terms of propagating single errors, to find its 
weaknesses and mitigate them in this research. 
Chapter 5: Proposed AES with Error Detection 
 
 66 
5.1 Error Detection in AES Logic Blocks 
In this thesis, the term logic block is referred to as a slice of the FPGA shown in Figure 31. The 
XOR operation and multiplexers, the only logic operations used in MixColumns and AddRoundKey, 
are implemented using logic blocks, Figure 31 shows 2 LUTs within a slice on a Virtex-II Pro slice. 
A result bit exits a LUT through multiplexers. An error in a logic block configuration bit controlling a 
LUT cell or a multiplexer can eventually manifest it elf as an erroneous result bit of a logic operation. 
Basically, an error in logic can be considered as an erroneous combinational bit (FX, Y, F5, X in 
Figure 31) or sequential bits (YQ, XQ in Figure 31). 
 
 
Figure 31 Virtex-II Pro slice [2] 
 
The top level view of the proposed architecture providing error detection in the AES encryption 
datapath is illustrated in Figure 32.  
 





Figure 32 AES including: (a) parity predictors and comparator for SubBytes result, (b) real and 
predicted parity comparator for MixColumns and AddRoundKey 
 
This section focuses on the logic blocks mapped on FPGA and error detection corresponding to 
logic blocks. In Figure 32(a), the grey elements represent AES (without showing ShiftRows that is 
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just rewiring, for the sake of simplicity) while the rest belong to error detection. Multiplexers (MUX 
A and B) select depending on the round number. In the initial round, the input plaintext is selected by 
MUX B for the initial AddRoundKey transformation while in the other rounds the output of 
MixColumns is sent to AddRoundKey. In the last round, the MixColumns transformation is skipped by 
MUX A. MUX C and MUX D select the corresponding party bits for each round .The select lines are 
derived by the control circuitry (shown in Appendix C) that mainly keeps track of the current round 
number and transformation. A block memory is used to produce the inverse in SubBytes. A dual 
ported block memory and the involution property in the inverse function motivate an attractive 
technique for error detection in SubBytes. Parity bits are used for MixColumns and AddRoundKey. 
Error detection for ShiftRows is not considered since it only cyclically shifts the rows of the state by 
different offsets (refer to Section 4.1.1). 
5.1.1 SubBytes Logic Blocks and Error Detection 
The SubBytes transformation shown in Equation (9) is the inverse function followed by the affine 
function (refer to Section 4.1.1 for more details). The inverse function is an involution. An involution 
is a type of function having the property that it is its own inverses. This is formally described in the
following definition [82].  
 
Definition: Let S  be a finite set and let f  be a bijection from S  to S  
(i.e. :f S S→ ). The function f is called an i volution if 1f f −= . An equivalent way 
of stating this is ( ( ))f f x x=  for all x S∈ . 
 
The concept of error detection for involution ciphers was first introduced in [117]. The involution 
property proposed in [117] is used to detect errors in the implementation of SubBytes using the dual 
ported block memory in this research. In Figure 32(a), the 8-bit input on the address line of Aport  is 
denoted b  ( portAaddr b= ). The 8-bit output on data line of Aport  is the inverse of b  
( ( )portAdata inverse b= ). Then ( )inverse b  is passed through the affine function, fed back through 
the inverse of the affine function, and it finally reaches the address line of Bport  
( ( )portBaddr inverse b= ). If there have not been any errors in reading the block memory or in 
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computation of affine function then data line of Bport  should show b , in other words  
( ( ( ))portBdata inverse inverse b b= = ). In other words, if portB portAdata addr≠  (or equivalently 
( ( ))inverse inverse b b≠ ) then some error, possibly multiple errors, have occurred in the block 
memory or affine function. The occurrence of errors triggers the SubBytes error flag depicted in 
Figure 32(a). 
5.1.2 MixColumns Logic Blocks and Error Detection 
An enhanced parity scheme is used for error detection of MixColumns. The goal is to detect any 
single errors in logic blocks, as opposed to detecting only the single errors in the output registers in 
previous research. In the error detection scheme, a parity bit is predicted for each 8-bit element of he
output state of MixColumns. The MixColumns output state and 16 corresponding parity bits are 
computed in parallel. At the output registers, as is hown in Figure 32(b), real parity bits computed 
directly from the output state are compared to the corresponding predicted parity bits to detect an 
error in the 8-bit registers of the MixColumns state. There are 2 important requirements in 
implementing the enhanced parity scheme.  
 First, a single error in the logic blocks should not affect an even number of bits in an 8-bit 
element of the state.  
 Second, a single error in the logic blocks should not affect the parity prediction and output 
producing circuit simultaneously such that the error is not detected.  
If these 2 important factors are not considered in the design mapped on FPGAs there could be cases 
that a single error can be missed without being detect d. Figure 33 illustrates a simple example to 
clarify the points discussed above. Assume that output bits output0 and output1 shown in Figure 33 
belong to an 8-bit element output that has a parity bit for error detection. The term outputi represents 
the ith bit of output, where output is 8-bit wide. Each LUT in Figure 33 implements a 4-intput XOR 
gate. In general, if there is an error in LUTA both output bits, output0 and output1, are affected. 
Therefore a parity bit is not able to detect that single error in LUTA. As can be seen from this 
example, the reason for this undesired outcome is the sharing of logic blocks (in this example, LUTA 
in Figure 33) in the circuit that generates an 8-bit element (output). Therefore, after mapping a design 
onto a FPGA, shared logic blocks need to be thoroughly examined to find if any of the above 2 
requirements has been violated. 





Figure 33 Single error in LUTA causing 2 bit flips in output 
 
The FPGA mapping of MixColumns on LUTs is depicted in Figure 34. Four 8-bit elements of a 
column of input state are shown as , b, c, and d. The MixColumns equation is expanded and 
rearranged so that it uses the smallest number of LUTs on an FPGA that contains 4-input LUTs. The 
proposed MixColumns mapping uses the smallest number of LUTs compared to previous research 
discussed in Section 6.2. In order to achieve this area optimization, the proposed architecture 
distinguishes 2 different groups of output bits in 8-bit elements as follows. 
 The output bits at positions {0, 2,5, 6, 7}  for which the ()xtime operation shown in 
Equation 22 requires only a bit shift. 
 The output bits at positions {1,3, 4}  for which the ()xtime operation shown in Equation 22 
requires a bit shift and an XOR. 
This grouping of bits in 8-bit elements of the MixColumns input column, described above, is based 
on the multiplication by 2 equation denoted function ()xtime  in Equation 22. In this equation, z and 
'z  are 8-bit input and output elements, respectively. ()xtime  can be implemented by 3 XOR 










Figure 34 Proposed MixColumns LUTs mapped on FPGA: (a) bit position {0,2,5,6,7}i ∈ , (b) bit 
position {1,3,4}j ∈  
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The expansion and rearrangement of MixColumns in Equation 23 is proposed for the first group 
where a bit position {0, 2,5, 6, 7}i ∈ , 1i −  is performed modulo 8, and the operator + is addition 
over 8GF . The term i i i ia b c d+ + +  is shared amongst all 4 bits 
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 (23) 
 
Equation 23 is then mapped to 2 levels of 4-input LUTs of FPGA shown in Figure 34(a). The 
resource sharing amongst 4 rows of the state column where {0, 2,5, 6, 7}i ∈  is illustrated in this 
figure where each LUT implements the 4-input XOR function.  
Next, the MixColumns transformation is expanded and rearranged as shown in Equation 24 for the 
second group of bits where a bit position {1,3, 4}j ∈ . Figure 34(b) shows Equation 24 mapped to 2 
levels of 4-input LUTs for the second group of bits. This mapping allows 2 j j ja b c+ +  and 
2j j ja c d+ +  to be shared between the 
' '( , )j ja d  and 
' '( , )j jb c  output bits of the state column, 
respectively. There are totally forty three 4-input XORs in the proposed MixColumns implementation. 
The 4-input LUTs generating the 4-input XORs had to be manually instantiated to produce the 
desired LUT schematic in Figure 34 after synthesis.  
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The first consideration, in the enhanced parity scheme, is that a single error in LUTs mapped on the 
FPGA should not affect an even number of bits in an 8-bit element of the output state. To investigate 
this, logic blocks that are shared between output bits need to be carefully examined. In Figure 34, 
where each LUT is an XOR, there is no logic block sharing among bits of an 8-bit result (for instance, 
there is no LUT sharing among bits 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7{ , , , , , , , }a a a a a a a a  in the 8-bit element a). 
However, there is LUT sharing between different 8-bit elements of a state column. For instance, 
although there is no LUT sharing between ia  and ja , there is an LUT shared between ia  and ib  in 
Figure 34. Therefore, a single error in a shared LUT is detected by different bits of the 16-bit error 
flag register. Consequently, there are not any single errors in logic blocks that affect an even number 
of bits in an 8-bit element of the state. Thus single errors are not missed and thus the first 
consideration of the enhanced parity scheme is met. 
The parity prediction that was given and proved in [76] is expanded and rearranged as shown in 
Equation 25 with respect to the 4-input LUT structure of FPGA to reduce the number of LUTs. 
, 'out zP  and ,in zP  correspond to the output and input parity bits of an 8-bit element z  in Equation 25. 
Chapter 5: Proposed AES with Error Detection 
 
 74 
The error detection hardware overhead is five 4-input LUTs per column of the state in the 
MixColumns transformation implemented on FPGA. 
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The second consideration is that a single error should not affect the parity prediction and output 
producing circuits simultaneously such that the error is not detected. Any single error that affects both 
logic blocks of parity prediction and output producing circuits is detected in the SubBytes error 
detection where it goes to the inverse affine functio s in Figure 32(a). Consequently, there are not ay 
single errors in logic blocks that affect both the MixColumns outputs and predicted parity bits without 
being detected. It should be noted that errors in routing are not considered yet and are discussed latr 
in Section 5.2. 
5.1.3 AddRoundKey Logic Blocks and Error Detection 
In the logic blocks related to AddRoundKey, 1 LUT combining multiplexer MUX B and 
AddRoundKey (dashed square in Figure 32(a)) is used for each output bit results.  There is no sharing 
between logic blocks of bits in an 8-bit element (for example, there is no LUT sharing among bits 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7{ , , , , , , , }a a a a a a a a  in the 8-bit element a), and thus the first consideration is met.  
The parity prediction and output producing circuits do not share any logic blocks, therefore the 
second consideration is met as well. The block memory of round keys stores the parity bits for the 
AddRoundKey parity predictor in Figure 32. Consequently, any si gle error in a logic block related to 
AddRoundKey does not affect more than 1 output bit and is detect d by the parity scheme. 
5.2 Error Detection in Routing of AES 
Since the proposed error detection of the SubBytes (refer to Section 5.1.1) is capable of detecting 
multiple errors, it does not have issues with a case where there is more than a single error whether in 
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the logic blocks or routing. Thus, any faults that c use multiple errors at the output of SubBytes are 
detected. 
However, since the parity scheme (capable of detecting singles errors only) is used in the 
MixColumns and AddRoundKey transformations, the routing needs to be investigated. Since a single 
error in the routing can affect multiple output bits, the error can be missed in error detection of output 
bits using the parity scheme. First, the error in routing is modeled in Section 5.2.1. Then this 
modeling is verified by inserting errors into a small part of the MixColumns implementation and 
observing the effects on the output bits. 
5.2.1 Error in Routing and Modeling 
This section focuses on the routing within the FPGA. Routing provides interconnections between 
logic blocks through nets [118][16]. A net contains static (non-configurable) wires, which are 
embedded in the FPGA fabric, as well as a configurable part. In a net, the configurable part which is 
called Programmable Interconnect Points (PIPs) provides connections between these static wires; a 
PIP is shown in Figure 35. 
 
 
Figure 35 Switch box and PIP controlled by SRAM cell
 
A PIP is basically a CMOS transistor switch that can be programmed to be turned on or off by an 
SRAM cell. Switch boxes are a collection of switches located between logic blocks. This allows some 
of the wire segments incident to the switch box to be connected to others. The term pin refers to a 
physical point in the FPGA. For instance, a pin canbe an input or output point attached to a LUT, 
flip-flop, or a multiplexer. A snap shot of a switch box and a PIP is shown in Figure 35 (note that pin 
connections through the switch box are provided by PIPs).  
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Since routing of a design is complex a simple yet accurate model needs to be defined so that effects 
of errors particularly soft errors can be understood. Input pins connect to logic blocks that compute 
each transformation and produce the values on 8-bitoutput pins of output flip-flops. Errors manifest 
themselves at pins. These pins either connect to combinational logic blocks (that can propagate an 
error) or sequential logic blocks (flip-flops that can store invalid data). Therefore, a pin fault model is 
used. Since the likelihood of multiple errors (in the context of soft errors) on input pins is extremely 
low the routing of each input pin is considered separately. 
In MixColumns and AddRoundKey, where the parity scheme is used, the only logic operation that is 
needed is XOR. An XOR operation does not mask an error. For instance, as is shown in Figure 36, a 
4-input XOR does not stop the propagation of a bit flip on its input pin (a bit flip is an error in the 
context of error detection). Therefore, combinational logic blocks propagating bit flips (or 
equivalently errors) can be ignored when the routing is being examined. 
 
 
Figure 36 XOR LUT propagating error whether (a) 0X Y Z⊕ ⊕ =  or (b) 1X Y Z⊕ ⊕ =  
 
In order to verify the pin fault model for soft erro s in SRAM cells of routing, a small part of 
MixColumns is tested on the FPGA. This is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
5.2.2 MixColumns Routing and Error Detection 
The enhanced parity scheme is used in MixColumns and AddRoundKey to detect errors in the 
routing other than logic blocks. The 2 factors that are considered in the logic blocks (refer to Section 
5.1.2) should be investigated in the routing as well.  
 First, a single error in routing should not affect an even number of bits in an 8-bit element 
of the state.  
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 Second, a single error in routing should not affect the parity prediction and output 
producing circuit simultaneously such that the error is not detected.  
A design that provides any single error detection in logic blocks can have a routing circuit that does 
not achieve an overall 100% single error detection. To clarify this problem in routing, an example is 
given in Figure 37. This figure depicts a small part of a circuit that implements a parity scheme for 
two 8-bit elements. These two 8-bit elements in Figure 37 are _output a and _output b (ith bit of 
_output a is _ ioutput a ). Each 8-bit element has its own parity bit. Ignori g the routing circuitry 
in Figure 37(a), any single error in the logic blocks is detected, specifically by parity of utput_b 
(thus the parity of output_a does not need to, nor will, detect the error).  
 
 
Figure 37 Routing example (a) logic blocks without considering routing, (b) actual routing detail 
showing _pin p  
Consider the pin labeled _pin p  in Figure 37(b). If a single error affects the value at _pin p  
then both 0_output a  and 1_output a  can be erroneous. In this case, since 2 bits of the 8-bit 
element _output a are flipped the parity bit is not able to detect this error. As can be seen, this 
undesirable effect is due to a multiple fanout signal (at _pin p  in Figure 37) that is connected to 
multiple bits of an 8-bit element ( 0_output a  and 1_output a ). 
This simple example demonstrates the importance of xamining the effectiveness of the parity 
scheme implementation in detecting single errors in routing other than logic blocks. In this research, 
the goal is to find out all the pins leading up to p tential undetectable single errors and provide a 
mitigation technique. 
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As discussed in Section 5.1.2, weaknesses of the parity scheme in logic blocks are due to resource 
sharing whereas weaknesses in routing are due to multiple fanout signals according to the pin fault 
model. In order to verify this on the FPGA, a small part of MixColumns, shown in Figure 38, is 
implemented with a multiple fanout signal at _pin p . The output bits connected to LEDs are 
observed to find if the multiple fanout signal causes this problem in routing. Figure 39 illustrates 
more detailed information i.e. slices and SRAM cells. The snapshot of the FPGA Editor is shown in 
Figure 66 and Figure 67 of Appendix H. 
 
 
Figure 38 Routing of 2 fanout signal in MixColumns tested on FPGA  
 
 
Figure 39 Detailed routing of 2 fanout signals in MixColumns tested on FPGA 
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In Figure 38, the input flip-flop is one bit result ( 4a  of 8-bit element a ) from SubBytes and the 
LUTs implement 4-input XOR operations in MixColumns. The output bits ( '4d , 
'
5d , and 
'
5a ) are 3 
bits of the MixColumns result. Output bits '4d  and 
'
5d  are 2 bits of the 8-bit element 
'd . According to 
the pin fault model, if there is an error in the routing that affects both these bits ('4d  and 
'
5d ) it is not 
detected by the parity bit of 8-bit element d .
5.2.2.1 Experimental Validation of Proposed Routing  Mitigation Technique 
In order to investigate the effects of single errors n FPGA, the configuration bits that control the 
routing should be manually flipped one at a time to simulate a soft error occurrence. Then the output 
bits connected to LEDs need to be observed to examine the effect of an error on the result. Other 
techniques used previously to estimate the soft error rate for a device (not a specific design 
implementation) are expensive accelerated testing using particle beams, software simulation of a 
circuit (different quantitative models based on critQ ), and estimation by real particles. In this 
research, soft errors are simulated on a specific net by flipping the relevant configuration bits and the 
effects are observed. Then the mitigation technique proposed is verified by the second soft error 
simulation on the specific net. 
The FPGA used in this research is Virtex-II Pro whose configuration file size is 34,292,768 bits 
[2]. It is important to note that the mapping of a netlist after place and route onto the configuration 
bits (or FPGA SRAM cells) is proprietary information. Therefore, there is no direct way of finding 
configuration bits that are related to the net betwe n the flip-flops and LUTs in Figure 38 so they can
be flipped for the experiment to simulate SEUs. 
 To overcome this problem the net is manually removed from the design netlist by the FPGA Editor 
tool and the modified configuration file is generatd. Then the original configuration file is compared 
with the modified configuration file by a program written in C++.  After running this comparison in 
software there are totally 14 bits that are different in these 2 configuration files. These different bits 
indicate the bits that are related to the net (betwe n the flip-flops and LUTs in Figure 38) that is 
removed in the modified netlist. Next, these 14 bits related to the routing are flipped one at a time. 
Figure 40 illustrates the flow to simulate SEUs in a et. 
 





Figure 40 SEU simulation in net 
After each bit flip, the configuration file is downloaded on the FPGA and the output bits ('4d , 
'
5d , 
and '5a ) connected to LEDs are observed. Cyclic Redundancy Checking (CRC) is turned off during 
the configuration. The effects of single errors simulating soft errors in routing on the output bits are
categorized in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 Effects of single errors in net including _pin p  on output bits 





wrong wrong correct 
wrong correct correct 
correct wrong correct 
effects of single errors in net on output bits 
correct correct wrong 
 
As seen in the first row of Table 5.1, a single error in the routing can affect both '4d  and 
'
5d . In this 
case, since 2 bits of the 8-bit element 'd are affected the parity scheme does not detect the error. This 
example shows that the pin fault model while ignorig the XORs can accurately demonstrate the 
effects of single errors on the FPGA. In Figure 38, as predicted in the pin fault model a single error on 
_pin p  affects both '4d  and 
'
5d . 
In general, if there are multiple output bits of an 8-bit element that are connected to a pin of a net 
that pin can lead up to undetectable single errors. Mitigating this problem requires modification in the 
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routing. However, there is not much modification that can be done on a netlist at such a fine-grained 
level by the tool. Additionally, even if this modification at the placed and routed netlist were possible 
it would make the design process tedious. 
A mitigation technique is introduced in this research that is done at the register-transfer level. The
goal is to avoid pins causing undetectable single errors (pins to which multiple bits of an 8-bit outp 
are connected) to avoid an even number of errors in the output (an even number of errors are not 
detected by the parity scheme). The proposed technique uses extra flip-flops in order to force the 
FPGA tool at the register-transfer level to eliminate these pins. For instance, Figure 41 illustrates th  
proposed technique to eliminate _pin p  shown in Figure 38. The snapshot of the FPGA Editor is 
shown in Figure 66 and Figure 67 of Appendix H. 
 
 
Figure 41 Routing with no pins leading up to undetectable errors 
 
Unlike the routing in Figure 38, there are no single errors in the routing shown in Figure 41 that 
affects '4d  and 
'
5d  only. This is verified by flipping the routing bits (the workaround to find the 
related configuration bits in routing was discussed for the experiment in Figure 38) and the effects of 
single errors in the net including _pin q  is categorized Table 5.2. As seen in this table there is no 
cases in which '4d  and 
'




5a  are affected, parties of 8-bit 
elements d and a both detect the error in the net. 
 
 












correct wrong wrong 
correct wrong correct effects of single errors in net on output bits 
correct correct wrong 
 
5.2.2.2 Detailed MixColumns SEU-resistant Routing 
Next, the proposed technique using extra flip-flops in routing is going to be applied throughout the 
MixColumns implementation. The first step is to find the pins leading to undetectable errors in the 
nets of MixColumns shown in Figure 34. The extra flip-flops are used to avoid these pins. 
There are 2 levels of LUTs, referred to as L for LUTs on the left and R for LUTs on the right in 
each circuit of Figure 34. The net between LUTs L and LUTs R in Figure 34(a) is connected to 4 
input ports of LUTs which define bits ' ' ' '( , , , )i i i ia b c d . Each of these bits belongs to a different 8-bit 
element ( ' ' ' ', , ,i i i ia b c d  belong to 
' ' ' ', , ,a b c d , respectively). Therefore, there is no pin which has 
multiple fanout signals among bits of an 8-bit element. This holds true for the nets between LUTs L 
and LUTs R in Figure 34(b) as well. As seen in Figure 34(b), there are 2 multiple fanout signals 
connected to ( ' ',j ja d ) and (
' ',j jb c ). Therefore, there are no pins causing undetectable errors in routing 
between LUTs L and LUTs R in Figure 34(b) either.  
Investigating signals that are not necessarily betwe n LUT L and LUT R is more complicated. The 
available routing between an input pin and output pin of LUTs is shown in Table 5.3 to Table 5.6. 
Letters L and R are associated to the left and right LUT connected in a signal path to and connected 
directly to an output pin, respectively. For example, in row of input 7a  in Table 5.3, 7a  is connected 
















4d , and 
'
7d  and 7a  is also connected to the input pin of three LUT R’s whose output 
pins are  '0a , 
'
7a , and 
'
0d . Table 5.3 presents a notation for labeling of the LUTs (or equivalently 
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7d (L) refers to LUT 




7c , and 
'
7d  in Figure 42. Additionally in Figure 42 
'
7a (R) (also 
listed in last row of  Table 5.3) refers to LUT R connected to '7a . 
 
Table 5.3 Input nets to input pins of LUTs of 8-bit element a 























































































































7d (L) and 
'
7a (R) related to input 7a  in Table 5.3 
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The complete row of input 7a  is illustrated in Figure 43. For example, 
'
0a (R) refers to the LUT R 
in the middle circuit in Figure 43 (4th column of LUTs from the left), specifically LUT R whose input 
is 7a  and whose output is 
'
0a . Similarly, 
'
1a (L) refers to the LUT L in the circuit on the right in 
Figure 43 whose output is routed to 2 LUT Rs one of which outputs '1a .  
 
 






















4d , and 
'
7d through LUTs 
 
The proposed mitigation is discussed for input 7a  then the same concept is expanded for the whole 
MixColumns design. There is a potential of errors not being detected when there is a multiple fanout 
signal connecting input 7a  to the following LUTs: 








7a (R)  
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7d (L)) is not included since any single error in this 7a  net that affects the results at 
'
7a (L) and 
'
7d (L) is detected by the parity bits of 




7d , and 
'
7c ), even though this error might not be detected by parity the bits of 
'a  and 'd . For 
instance, an error in the 7a  net that affects 
'
7a (L) and 
'
0a (R) is not detected by the parity bit of 
'a  (2 
errors are not detected by a parity bit); however th  parity bits of 'b  and 'c  detect this error. The 
proposed technique, shown in Figure 44, uses extra flip-flops at the register-transfer level to prevent 
pins which cause undetected single errors in a net. For instance, in the 7a  net discussed above, the 
mapped design illustrated in Figure 44 does not have any of these pins. 
 
 
Figure 44 Proposed routing applied to net 7a  
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For further clarification, Figure 45 shows  part of the original MixColumns datapath (see Figure 
32(a) for the complete datapath) which was modified  n Figure 44. The 7a  flip-flop (resulting from 
SubBytes) in Figure 45 is copied 5 times in Figure 44 to prevent undetected single errors in routing. 






















4d , and 
'
7d . The error 
checker (of Figure 44) is basically the part of datap th (in Figure 32(a)) that includes inverse affine 
function (refer to Section 5.1.1). 
 
 
Figure 45 Part of datapath (shown in Figure 32(a)) that is routed in Figure 44 
 
The multiple fanout signal 7a  in the proposed routing shown in Figure 44 is a solution which 
separates bits that cause potentially undetected single errors in the multiple fanout signal by using 
extra flip-flops. Each flip-flop in Figure 44 is connected to the input pins of the corresponding LUTs 
(from Figure 43). The multiple fanout pins (7a  result from SubBytes, P1, and P2) before the flip-flops 
in Figure 44 are not problematic pins. An error in p 7a  is detected through the error checker. An 
error in pin P1 is detected by the parity bits of 'a , 'b , 'c , and 'd , since there is an odd number of 














1d (L) located after pin 




1a (L), and 3 d’ nets, etc). An error in pin P2 is 
detected by the parity bit of 'a  (due to an odd number of 'a elements). 
The parity predictor does not have any multiple fanout signals in the net producing output pins 
(e.g., P0 is a multiple fanout signal connected to the error checker and none of the output pins in 
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Figure 44). Therefore, a single error in routing does not affect the parity prediction and output 
producing circuit simultaneously such that the error is not detected.  
The multiple fanout signals after the flip-flops in Figure 44 do not have any pins leading up to 
undetected single errors either. In the nets after th  flip-flops, any single error in routing that affects 
multiple output bits is detected by at least one parity bit in Figure 44. This is discussed in more detail 
as follows. 























7c , and 
'
7d )) is definitely detected by parity bits of 8-bit elements 
'b  and 'c . Other 
single errors in this net that affect '0a (R) or 
'
0d (R) are detected by parity bits of 8-bit 
elements 'a and 'd . 
 In net '1a (L)
'
1d (L) shown in Figure 44, any single error is detected by parity bits of 8-bit 
elements 'a  and  'd  independently. 




7a  (R) shown in Figure 44, any single error is detected by parity bits of  
8-bit elements 'a  or 'd . 
 In the '4a (L)
'
4d (L) shown in Figure 44, any single error is detected by parity bits of 8-bit 
elements 'a  and  'd  independently. 
All the multiple fanout pins investigated above confirm that all single errors are detected in the 
proposed routing for input net 7a . The proposed method is then used for the whole MixColumns 
routing for each row of Table 5.3 to Table 5.6. It should be noted that not every row in the tables has 
single errors not being detected. For instance, in the row of net 0a  of Table 5.3 (shown in Figure 47) 
there is no multiple fanout pin that can be problematic. If there is a single error in this net that affects 












0c , and 
'
0d ) it is definitely detected by parity bits of  8-bit elements 
'b  and 'c . Other single 
errors in the net are detected by parity bits of 'a  and 'd  independently. 















0d , and 
'
1d  through LUTs 
 
 
Figure 47 Proposed routing applied to net 0a  
The proposed method in routing is shown for the other input bits ( 1a , 4a , 5a , 6a ) with potential 
problematic pins of a mitigated in Figure 48. Similar to the routing of 0a , routing of 2a  and 3a  do 










Figure 48 Proposed routing applied to net 1a , 4a , 5a , and 6a  
 
Input nets of 8-bit element c  connected to output pins of LUTs in Table 5.4 have similar structure 
to that of a ; therefore the routings are similar as well. Columns that are similar in both a  in Table 
5.3 and c  in Table 5.4 are as follows: columns (1 and 3), (2 and 4), (3 and 1), and (4 and 2), 
respectively. The routings of c are shown in Figure 49. Nets 0c , 2c , and 3c  do not have any multiple 
fanout signals that cause undetected single errors.  
  
 




Table 5.4 Input nets to input pins of LUTs of 8-bit element c  

















































































































Figure 49 Proposed routing applied to net 1c , 4c , 5c , and 6c  
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The proposed routing based on Table 5.5 is used for rows of b  and is shown in Figure 50. Nets 1b , 




1d (L) it is always detected by the parity bit of 8-bit element 
'd .  Any other error that affects 
LUTs '2a (R), 
'
2b (R), or 
'
1c (R) is detected by parity bits of  
'a  (if LUT '1a (L)
'
1d (L) is not affected), 
'b ,  or 'c , respectively. 
 
Table 5.5 Input nets to input pins of LUTs of 8-bit element b  
Input 





















































































































Figure 50 Proposed routing applied to net 0b , 2b , 5b , 6b , and 7b  
 
Input nets of d to output pins of LUTs in Table 5.6 are similar to that of b  therefore the routings are 
similar. In Table 5.6 and Table 5.5, similar columns of b  and d are (1 and 3), (2 and 4), (3 and 1), 
and (4 and 2), respectively. The routings of d  are shown in Figure 51. Nets 1d , 3d , and 4d  do not 
have any multiple fanout signals that lead up to undetected single errors. 
 
Table 5.6 Input nets to input pins of LUTs of 8-bit element d  




















































































































Figure 51 Proposed routing applied to net 0d , 2d , 5d , 6d , and 7d  
5.2.3 AddRoundKey Routing and Error Detection 
As discussed in Section 5.1.3 logic blocks of AddRoundKey are separate. There is 1 LUT 
associated with each output bit of AddRoundKey. Therefore, there are not multiple fanout signals 
related to bits of an 8-bit output. Consequently, when an error propagates it is not able to affect more 
than 1 output bit and the parity scheme detects the error. 
Since the parity prediction and output producing circuits do not share any logic blocks, there are 
not any multiple fanout signals related to parity prediction and output bits either. Thus, an error is not 
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able to affect a parity bit and its 8-bit output at the same time. Consequently, the parity scheme 
detects all the single errors in the AddRoundKey implementation. 
5.2.4 Control Circuit and Error Detection 
The control circuitry, consisting of 2 state machines shown in Appendix C, generates the select 
signals to the multiplexers (MUX A, MUX B, MUX C, and MUX D) in the datapath shown in Figure 
32(a). In the proposed state machines, shift registrs instead of counters are used to keep track of 
rounds and transformations. An interesting feature of the Virtex-II Pro FPGA used is that a LUT can 
be set to implement a shift register [119]. This shift register LUT can be of length 1-16. Using this 
feature keeping track of rounds uses just 1 LUT to implement. Without this feature, N number of flip-
flops (where N is the number of rounds in AES) are needed to imple ent an N-bit shift register. 
The control circuit affects the datapath through select signals of the multiplexers (see Figure 32(a)). 
This could make the parity scheme used in the datapath ineffective in detecting single errors since it 
can violate the 2 requirements described in Section 5.1.2. Therefore, the control circuit should also be 
considered in error detection. 
In order to ensure a single error in logic blocks does not affect multiple bits in an 8-bit element of 
the state, the control circuitry is duplicated for each bit of an 8-bit output and shared between 16 
elements of the state. Additionally, to make certain hat a single error in logic blocks does not affect 
the parity prediction and output producing circuit simultaneously, the control circuitry is duplicated 
for the parity prediction. The duplications use relatively small number of resources (1 LUT is 
minimal resource used for a shift register as discus ed above) compared to that of AES. Usage of 
hardware resources is discussed in Section 6.3.  Since duplication is used for the control circuitry all 
single errors are detected. 
5.3 Soft Error Resistant AES for Different Key Size s and Decryption 
In this research, the proposed error detection of AES with key size of 128 bits is expanded to the 
other versions of AES with key sizes of 192 and 256 bits. The part that is different in the AES 
algorithm with key sizes 128, 192, and 256 bits is the control circuitry. The shift register LUT 
supports length of 1-16. The maximum number of rounds is 14 for key size of 256 bits (refer to  
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Table 4.2). Since the maximum number of rounds does not exceed the maximum length of the shift 
register LUT, all key sizes use 1 LUT to keep track of rounds. 
All versions of AES with different key sizes are implemented in this research. Compared to the 
AES implementation including datapath and control circuit, the overhead of the control circuitry is 
about 2.6% and 3% in terms of flip-flops and LUTs, respectively. Overall, the overhead of hardware 
resources of the control circuitry is not significant lthough duplication and comparison are used for 
error detection.  
The proposed method can also benefit the AES decryption. The inverse SubBytes can directly 
benefit from the approach proposed for SubBytes, since it has a very similar structure that includes the 
inverse function implemented in a dual ported block memory (refer to 5.1.1). The inverse 
MixColumns transformation includes XOR operations (XOR propagate errors as opposed to other 
logical operations) similar to MixColumns. Therefore, the same 2 requirements in the introduce  
enhanced parity scheme (refer to 5.1.2 and 5.2.2) can be applied to the inverse MixColumns 
implementation. Inverse AddRoundKey and the control circuit also benefit from the error detection 
proposed for the AES encryption. 
5.4 Summary 
The proposed error detection technique uses some of the mathematical properties of AES and 
available hardware resources on FPGA to detect errors in SubBytes and the control circuitry 
implemented. Enhancements to the parity scheme (used for error detection in MixColumns and 
AddRoundKey) to increase its error coverage were also proposed in this research. 
The inverse function of SubBytes is an involution meaning that it is its own invers. A dual ported 
block memory exploits this property for error detection. The inverse result is fed back to the second 
address port of the dual ported block memory. If the data on the second port is different from the 
value on the first address line, then there have been some errors. This method using the dual ported 
block memory plus the inverse of affine is used for error detection in SubBytes. 
The control circuitry uses shift registers to contrl he select lines of multiplexers. Shift register 
were implemented with an interesting feature on the FPGA that implements a shift register of length 
1-16 by a single LUT. Since 1 LUT is very small in terms of hardware, duplication is used for the 
control in this research. 
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The enhanced parity scheme was used for MixColumns and AddRoundKey transformations. In 
order to increase the error coverage of the parity technique, the weaknesses of it on FPGA were first 
found in this research. The high density of SRAM cells and lack of available information (mapping of 
configuration bits onto netlist after place and route is proprietary information) make analyzing the 
effect of faults on an implementation challenging. In order to tackle this problem, the high regularity 
in the FPGA structure is exploited. The pin fault model was suggested for modeling and analysis 
when there is a wrong value in an SRAM cell due to soft errors. A small part of the MixColumns was 
tested by simulating single errors to verify this model. Simulating soft errors was achieved by 
basically flipping 1 bit at a time in the configuration file, then downloading it on FPGA and observing 
the output bits. This simple and yet accurate enough model was verified. Since FPGA has a very 
regular structure the result of the verification was expanded for the whole device. 
The parity technique covers the errors in datapath registers only. However, errors due to radiation 
can occur in any SRAM cells forming the combinational logic and routing of a design implemented 
on FPGA. Propagation of single errors was thoroughly examined in the AES netlist after place and 
route by using the pin fault model. There are 2 situat ons when an error can go undetected in the 
parity scheme. First, if a single error can potentially affect an even number of output bits. Second, 
errors can go undetected if both output bits and parity bit are affected by a single error. LUTs were 
designed manually in the netlist to resolve single errors being undetected in combinational logic. 
Extra flip-flops were used at the register-transfer level to tackle errors being undetected in routing o  
FPGA in this research. 
In the next chapter, experimental results of different implementations on FPGA and comparisons 
with the proposed design are provided. The coverage of soft errors in all the techniques implemented 
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Chapter 6 
Comparison with Previous Research 
In this chapter, the proposed error mitigation approach to AES is compared with previous research. 
To support a fair quantitative comparison, previously researched architectures were implemented in 
the same technology as the proposed AES architecture. The error coverage of the proposed technique 
is compared with previous parity schemes and DMR. Additionally, as the new proposed part of AES, 
the new implementation of MixColumns, is compared with the state of the art. Comparisons f the 
number of LUTs and flip-flops, block memory size, clock frequency, throughput, and power 
consumption are provided. 
6.1 AES Hardware Design 
There have been numerous hardware (FPGA and ASIC) implementations proposed for AES since 
it was accepted in 2000. Each design typically focuses on one or more constraints i.e. throughput, 
area, or power and also must target a specific technology. The relevant architectural designs in this 
research have been implemented in order to provide a fair and exact comparison utilizing the same 
technology and are discussed in detail in the sections that follow. Moreover, this section reviews 
some of the previous research from a general hardware design perspective. 
There have been mainly 3 different datapath widths (128 bits [98][120][121], 32 bits [115][122], 
and 8 bits [123][124][125][126, 127]) for the AES architecture. Obviously, wider datapaths aim for 
higher throughput while narrower datapaths typically target reducing area and power. Hardware 
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resources are reused in narrow datapaths to reduce area. This lowers the level of parallelism and thus 
reduces performance (throughput) [121].  
Since the AES algorithm has an iterative looping structure (Figure 52(a)), loop unrolling illustrated 
in Figure 52(b) can be used to increase the level of parallelism for high performance applications. 
Therefore, throughput can improve by this technique. However, this comes at a price as hardware 




Figure 52 Higher level of parallelism provided by loop unrolling: (a) AES iterative looping structure, 
(b) N-time loop unrolling [121] 
 
Throughput is computed as shown in Equation 26 where N is the number of times that the loop is 
unrolled. As seen in Equation 26, loop unrolling can significantly improve throughput. If a design is 
fully unrolled, then N is equal to the number of rounds and the maximum throughput is achieved at 
the cost of approximately N times the area. Furthermore, round transformations ca  be pipelined to 
increase the clock frequency [98] [120][121]. 







=  (26) 
 
Experimental results of some of the previous research are presented in Table 6.1 and briefly 
discussed without going into specific details of each rchitecture.  
 
Table 6.1 AES previous implementations 
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- 100 - 
692µW at 
0.75V 













- 128 0.102 49µW  








- 152 0.121 37µW 





- 142.8 0.0147 43mW 





- 68.9 0.013 26mW 
  
Previous researchers in [98] [120][121] aimed at high performance. Design [120] (row 5 in Table 
6.1) uses composite field 4 2((2 ) )GF  for the SubBytes transformation while SubBytes in row 4 is 
memory based. 
The parity for S-box was proposed in [113] for error detection. Distributed RAMs were used for 
implementing SubBytes. Their results seem to be after XST synthesis and not place and route. In 
[114], the composite field SubBytes and its inverse were divided into blocks and the predicted parities 
of these blocks were computed. Optimum solution for the composite field in terms of overhead was 
found through exhaustive search. 
Researchers in [115] used a 32-bit datapath for a compact ASIC implementation of AES. To 
provide error detection, S-boxes were duplicated an parity bits were used for other AES 
transformations. 
Research [123][124][125][126, 127] proposed different architectures for the 8-bit datapath aiming 
at reducing area and power. Results have been reported n various technologies including CMOS and 
FPGAs. 
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6.2 Experimental Results of MixColumns 
Previous equations of MixColumns presented in Section 4.3.2 are implemented in FPGA 
technologies for a fair comparison with the proposed d sign (refer to 5.1.2). As discussed in 4.3.2, the 
MixColumns in [98, 102],  [112], and [108, 109] used Equation 20, Equation 12, and Equation 21, 
respectively. 
The experimental results use the Xilinx Virtex-4 FPGA (target device: xc4vlx15-10ff668) as well 
as Altera Cyclone (target device: EP1C3T144C6). These FPGAs use 4-input LUTs as function 
generators. Manual instantiation was used to prevent further modification by the tool (due to 
optimization) and the netlist was verified after place and route.  
 The number of LUTs and the corresponding LUT savings for the MixColumns implementations 
are shown in Table 6.2. The input and output signals are 32-bit columns of the state. As observed in 
Table 6.2, improvements are more significant in case of the Xilinx synthesizer than Altera 
synthesizer, since they use different mapping algorithms. The LUT savings on Virtex-4 and Cyclone 
FPGAs are at least 20% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 6.2 Experimental results of MixColumns implementations on FPGA 
MixColumns 
implementations 
# of LUTs 
on Virtex-4 
% of LUTs of 
LUT savings 
Virtex-4 
# of LUTs on 
Cyclone 





43 - 43 - 
MixColumns in [98, 
102] 
56 23.21 51 15.68 
MixColumns in [112] 54 20.37 48 10.41 
MixColumns in [108, 
109] 
55 21.28 51 15.68 
 
6.3 Experimental Results of AES with Soft Error Mit igation 
As illustrated in Figure 53, previous research in error detection using the parity scheme in AES 
[76-78] focuses mainly on covering errors occurring i  datapath registers. The Hamming code with 8 
data bits and 4 check bits (12-bit codeword) for single error correction in AES was suggested in [75]. 
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Figure 53 Error coverage of single errors using parity in previous research 
 
 
Figure 54 Error coverage of errors using Hamming code in previous research 
 
These techniques do not provide error coverage for other logic and routing elements. They do not 
cover any errors happening in the control circuitry either. SEUs affect all the hardware resources 
(logic elements such as LUTs and SRAM switches controlling routing) on an FPGA. SETs can also 
generate glitches in the combinational logic and routing of a design implemented. Therefore, these 
methods covering errors in datapath registers are not sufficient for an implementation on FPGA. 
Chapter 6: Comparison with Previous Research 
 
 103 
However, they provide sufficient error coverage caused by SEUs for the datapath of an ASIC 
implementation, since SEUs cause errors only in flip-flops on ASIC (refer to Section 3.4). Other 
hardware modular redundancy techniques such as DMR and TMR (refer to Section 3.2) provide 
coverage for multiple errors but they are expensive and the likelihood of having multiple soft errors is 
extremely low. 
It should also be noted that the concurrent error cor e tion capability of techniques such as the 
Hamming code and TMR can be affected on FPGA when SEUs occur. These error correcting 
techniques can potentially lose their effectiveness (correct functionality), since an SEU can affect the
functionality of the correction circuitry. Additionally, SEUs keep accumulating on FPGA until it is 
reconfigured. Due to unknown outcome of concurrent correcting techniques in previous research, re-
computation of the last input after reconfiguration f FPGA is suggested in this research. A 
reconfiguration is done when an error is detected (r fer to Appendix B). 
SEU and SET occurrences are random in time and space. The likelihood of multiple SEUs or SETs 
happening in 1 clock cycle is extremely low. Among detection techniques, the parity scheme is the 
lowest cost (in terms of hardware resources) and potentially adequate choice that matches the nature 
of SEU and SET occurrences. 
In this section, the experimental results show usage of hardware resources, timing information, 
power consumption, and detection and correction capabilities in some of the relevant techniques in 
previous research and the proposed design. All these techniques have been implemented on the same 
FPGA (Virtex-II Pro device: xc2vp100-6ff1704) to provide a fair basis for comparing the results. 
There have been different approaches for the SubBytes in composite fields [98-102][103, 104]. Since 
the implementation of SubBytes [102] in composite fields in this research is not heavily pipelined to 
achieve the highest frequency, it is not expected to have significantly different results from 











Table 6.3 Results of different designs of parity scheme in AES 
Designs using 





















1188 1126 4% 186.7 2.39 865.60 
Composite fields 
AES in [102] with 
parity (SubBytes 
parity in [77]) 
2363 662 1% 145.9 1.86 4136.22 
Memory based 
AES [76]  
665 516 8% 215.1 2.75 641.48 
 
Researchers in [77] provide the parity prediction frmula, shown in Equation 27, for an 8-bit 
element b  input to SubBytes. In this equation, symbol 1 _ inputδ −  is the input to function 1δ −  for 
isomorphic mapping (refer to Figure 29). The indexes indicate bit position in an 8-bit 1 _ inputδ −  in 
Equation 27 (for instance, 1 0_ inputδ
−  is bit 0). This parity prediction formula can be used in the 
SubBytes that is implemented using composite fields. The SubBytes in composite fields suggested in 
[102] and parity predictions in [77] and Equation 27 are implemented on the FPGA in VHDL. The 
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It should be noted these results, except for the throughput and clock frequency, are overly 
optimistic for the composite field implementation of AES encryption since this design can be further 
pipelined thus adding a large number of flip-flops to the 128-bit datapath. As expected, the 
implementation in composite fields uses the largest number of LUTs in order to achieve a high 
throughput if it is heavily pipelined. 
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The parity coding for error detection is used in [76] with a memory based implementation of 
SubBytes. In a memory based SubBytes, an S-box alone is implemented by a 256x8-bit block memory 
for each 8-bit element of the state. In order to generate the predicted parity bit, a parity bit is adde  
for each 8-bit element in [76]. The parity bit is al o added to the address line of the memory to detect 
single errors at the output of AddRoundKey (input to SubBytes). If the output of the AddRoundKey is 
wrong a deliberate wrong content (e.g., 000000001) is stored in the memory. Overall, a 519x9-bit 
block memory is used for SubBytes with parity coding in [76]. 
Another part of the block memory that is partially covered against errors in [76] is the address 
decoder. A single error in the decoder causes the wrong memory location to be accessed. However, 
the content of this address has a valid parity bit. In order to mitigate this, adding a separate 256x1-bit 
block memory was suggested in [76]. This stores an extra set of parity bits for 8-bit SubBytes values. 
Each parity bit from the 519x9-bit memory is compared to the parity bit from the 256x1-bit block 
memory to find an error in the decoder. The detection in this method provides error coverage of 50% 
for single errors in the block memory decoder, since there is still a probability of 0.5 that both parity 
bits match while the wrong address is accessed. 
The MixColumns parity prediction used for all the designs is shown in Equation 25 [76]. The parity 
prediction of AddRoundKey is the XOR of the input parity and key parity.  
The proposed design of AES with the enhanced parity scheme has about the same number of LUTs 
and flip-flops. The balance between the number of LUTs and flip-flops is still reasonable in terms 
resource utilization since there is 1 flip-flop for each LUT on the FPGA. The number of flip-flops is 
larger than other implementations since data (output of AddRoundKey) need to be delayed for the 
equality comparator shown in Figure 32(a) and the routing is controlled by flip-flops as well. The 
largest number of LUTs is in AES in composite fields [102] with SubBytes parity [77] and 
MixColumns parity in Equation 25 (row 2 in Table 6.3); it has about double the number of LUTs than 
the proposed AES with the enhanced parity scheme. Iplementation of [76] has the highest block 
memory utilization on the FPGA due to extra block memories needed to store the parity of SubBytes.  
In the proposed AES with the enhanced parity scheme, there is about 13% reduction in the clock 
frequency and throughput compared to implementation of [76]. The post place and route static timing 
analysis shows that the second port of the dual ported block memory to the output of the 8-bit equal 
comparator is the critical path.  
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In order to estimate power consumption, the same random input data generated by function 
UNIFORM() in VHDL at the clock frequency of 100 MHz is used in all the implementations. Static 
power consumption is constant 204.38mW for the FPGA. Implementation of [76] has the lowest 
dynamic and total power consumption since it uses th  largest number of block memories instead of 
LUTs for computations. 
It should be noted that the overhead of the control circuitry compared to the overall AES 
implementation is about 2.6% and 3% in terms of flip-flops and LUTs, respectively. Although 
duplication and comparison are used for error detection, the overhead of hardware resources of the 
control circuitry is not significant. 
The error coverage of SEUs for different parity design  are shown in Table 6.4. In the proposed 
design using the enhanced parity scheme, the propagation of an error from logic and routing resources 
to the output bits has been thoroughly investigated (r fer to Chapter 5). In this research, error 
detection is incorporated in the design process rathe  than being added as an after part. It is ensured 
that a single error in logic or routing resources does not affect an even number of bits in an 8-bit 
register of the state. It is also made certain that a single error in logic or routing resources does not 
affect the parity prediction and output producing circuit simultaneously such that the error is not 
detected. The control circuitry using minimal hardware resource (1 LUT for one-hot encoding) is 
duplicated for error detection. Thus, single errors due to SEUs in combinational and sequential 
elements of datapath, control circuitry, and routing are detected. 
Through analyzing and classifying the errors caused by SEUs in research [17], it is concluded that 
about 78% to 84.8% of the failures are due to SEUs in routing while the remaining approximately 
20% are due to upsets in logic excluding registers (re earchers in [17] focused on configuration bits 
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An SET, being equivalent to a glitch, can propagate through the combinational logic and get stored 
in result flip-flops. As opposed to SEUs, SETs do not change the functionality of the combinational 
logic on FPGA. They can potentially change the output flip-flops for 1 clock cycle. Since glitches in 
the combinational logic or routing are not considere  in previous research, using the previous parity 
schemes, an SET can potentially propagate through to flip-flops of the output and parity bits. These 
single errors due to SETs are not detected in previous research. 
Propagation of single errors in combinational logic as well as routing is thoroughly investigated in 
the proposed design (refer to Chapter 5). It is ensured that an SET (glitch) does not affect an even 
number of output flip-flops or the parity and output flip-flops simultaneously such that an error 
caused by an SET can escape undetected. The routing is controlled by using extra flip-flops at the 
register-transfer level, since it is not possible to change the routing at a fine-grained level after place 
and route. Therefore, single errors caused by SETs are detected in sequential logic of datapath and 
control circuitry in the proposed design as is shown in Table 6.5. 
 
 




Table 6.5 Error coverage of single SETs on FPGA 
 
Errors in sequential logic of 
datapath due to SETs 
Errors in sequential logic of 
control circuitry due to SETs 
Proposed AES with enhanced parity 
scheme 
Detected Detected 
Composite fields AES in [102] with 
parity (SubBytes parity in [77]) 
Not detected Not detected 
Memory based AES [76] with parity 
50% only in the block 
memory (S-box) decoder 
Not detected 
 
Overall, the proposed technique drastically expands the soft error coverage of parity coding to both 
logic and routing resources of datapath and control ci cuitry on an FPGA. 
The DMR method is also implemented for further comparisons with the proposed approach. Table 
6.6 shows the experimental results. In order to provide the redundancy in DMR, all the resources (i.e.
I/O pins, logic resources, and block memories) have to be duplicated. It should be noted that the S-
box is used in DMR (SubBytes is memory based in DMR) since the inverse and affine unctions do 
not need to be separated, as opposed to the proposed AES with error detection. 
 
























339 1188 1126 4% 186.7 2.39 865.60 
DMR 451 1233 865 9% 177.3 2.26 846.78 
 
Compared to the proposed technique, there is about 33% and 3.8% increase in I/O pins and LUTs, 
respectively, in DMR. Block memory utilization in DMR is more than twice compared to that of the 
proposed AES with enhanced parity scheme. The clock frequency and throughput is about 5% higher 
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in the proposed technique than DMR. There is also slight decrease of about 2% in the total power 
consumption of DMR than that of the proposed technique, since manual instantiation of LUTs and 
flip-flops slightly increase the power consumed by logic and routing.  
The proposed design has a relatively large number of flip-flops since the output of AddRoundKey 
needs to be delayed and the routing is also controlled by flip-flops to expend the error coverage of the
parity scheme. One solution to enhancing routing for the parity scheme without using flip-flops could 
be defining new implementation constraints to the tool in the future work. The enhancement in 
routing refers to removing the pins that lead up to undetected single errors (refer to Chapter 5). 
Implementation constraints are instructions that are given to software tools to direct different steps 
such as placement and routing in the design flow. For instance, locations constraints define the 
absolute or relative location of a design element on FPGA for the placement tool in Xilinx. In general, 
implementation constraints are placed in a constraint file or in the HDL code. Therefore, specifying 
constraints at the high level does not make the design process tedious. The subject of adding new 
constraints in the tool to control the pins along multiple fanout signals can be further investigated in 
future work. 
DMR provides multiple error coverage in all parts of design implemented but this is not necessary 
for soft errors, since the likelihood of multiple errors in 1 clock cycle in an implementation is 
extremely low. Therefore, the expensive feature of multiple error coverage is not needed to provide 
reliability. However, it is important to provide complete error coverage for single errors since the 
likelihood of single errors is high. This is provided in the proposed design using the enhanced parity 
error detection. 
In this research, round keys are stored in a block memory. The operations in key expansion 
generating round keys are SubBytes and shifts and XORs (key expansion pseudo code is given 
Appendix G). If round keys are to be computed they can use the similar error detection technique 
used for the SubBytes. In the control circuitry of key expansion, the same technique implementing 
shifts by LUTs and using duplication for the minimal h rdware can be applied (refer to Section 5.2.4). 
NIST approved modes such as CFB, OFB, CTR (confidentiality modes), CMAC (authentication 
mode), and CCM (authenticated encryption mode) directly benefit from the proposed AES with error 
detection. In the other authenticated encryption mode, GCM, multiplication in GHASH needs to be 
investigated against soft errors. This multiplication s in the Galois field of 1282  elements. The parity 
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technique and duplication should be compared in terms of costs for the right selection. There are 
various techniques for Galois field multiplication investigated in [106]. 
6.4 Summary 
The proposed AES with enhanced parity scheme was compared with other implementations of 
AES using the parity scheme. Overall, in terms of LUT and block memory utilization the proposed 
technique does not exceed the composite fields and memory based implementations, respectively. 
Compared to composite fields [102][77] and memory based [76] implementations of AES, the 
proposed design uses about half the number of LUTs and block memories, respectively. Compared to 
the memory based AES, there is about 13% reduction in the clock frequency and throughput. The 
memory based AES had about 25% less power consumption than the proposed design.  
DMR was also implemented for further comparisons. Compared to the proposed design, the DMR 
approach has about 33%, 3.8%, and 100% increase in I/O pins, LUTs, and block memories, 
respectively. The clock frequency is about 5% higher in the proposed design than DMR. There is a 
slight decrease of about 2% in power consumption of DMR than the proposed implementation. 
The most noticeable drawback in the proposed design experimental results was the relatively large 
number of flip-flops overall. This is due to delaying of the output of AddRoundKey to be 
synchronized with the dual ported block memory. Additionally, the routing has been controlled by 
flip-flops at the register-transfer level. However, since the number of flip-flops is not greater than that 
of LUTs this is still not an unbalanced design practice. 
Compared to previous AES designs using the parity scheme for error detection, the proposed 
technique significantly expands the soft error coverag  from datapath registers to both logic and 
routing resources of datapath and control circuitry on FPGA. DMR provides multiple error coverage 
in all parts of design implemented. However, this is not necessary in the case of soft errors since the 
likelihood of multiple errors in 1 clock cycle is exceedingly low. Therefore, the proposed AES with 
enhanced parity scheme provides a low cost adequate method. 
 
  111 
 
Chapter 7 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This research presented a new design for reliability of the symmetric-key algorithm AES in 
FPGAs. The AES algorithm is highly sensitive to errors by nature. For instance, a single-bit flip in the
early rounds of AES encryption is expected to in 50% erroneous bits in the output [76]. This indicates 
a good diffusion in the AES algorithm. Diffusion is a desirable property for a strong cryptographic 
algorithm; however it becomes a critical issue in error propagation and especially reliability of AES 
in the FPGA. Reliable implementations of the error sensitive AES in the FPGA is important since 
FPGAs are prone to soft errors caused by radiation. Energetic particles hitting a device can flip 
SRAM cells controlling all aspects of the implementation in a dense SRAM-based FPGA. For 
instance, a Virtex-II Pro FPGA contains 34,292,768 SRAM cells [2]. Different error detection 
techniques based on properties of the circuit and AES transformations were used to provide adequate 
reliability at the lowest possible cost. Dual-ported block memory for SubBytes, duplication for the 
control circuitry, and the proposed enhanced parity technique for MixColumns were used. In this 
research, propagation of single errors was investigated in the placed and routed netlist. Weaknesses of 
the previous parity techniques were researched. Flip-flops at the register-transfer level were 
introduced to resolve undetected single errors in the routing. LUTs were designed for MixColumns 
with minimum number of LUTs to prevent undetected single errors in the combinational logic. 
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The peculiar effects of soft errors in a design implemented on SRAM-based FPGA were 
investigated. Furthermore, the errors caused by these faults in ASIC and FPGA were compared. Logic 
blocks in the combinational logic as well as routing of the FPGA are controlled thoroughly by SRAM 
cells. Therefore, SEUs can affect the combinational logic and routing on the FPGA and are not 
eliminated until a reconfiguration is done. This effect does not happen in an ASIC. Since the 
combinational logic and routing on ASIC do not have any storage elements, SEUs can only affect 
flip-flops. Previous research [75][76][77] on mitigating soft errors in the AES implementations 
(primarily focusing on datapath registers) did not c nsider all aspects of soft errors in the FPGA. 
A dual ported block memory and the inverse function of SubBytes were used for error detection in 
this transformation of AES. Unlike previous research [76][77] using a parity scheme for every AES 
transformation, mathematical properties of SubBytes and dual ported block memory were used to 
expand soft error coverage from datapath registers to combinational logic and routing in the FPGA. 
The control circuitry uses shift registers (one-hot encoding) to control the select lines of 
multiplexers. Shift registers were implemented by a single LUT. Since 1 LUT is the minimal 
hardware resource, duplication was used for the control circuitry to provide error detection in this 
research. Error detection for the control circuitry was not considered in previous research 
[75][76][77]. 
Since soft errors threatening the reliability of FPGA implementations occur randomly and the 
likelihood of multiple errors in 1 clock cycle is exceedingly low, the low cost parity scheme is a 
suitable error detection technique. Previously, a parity scheme was used for error detection in 
registers of datapath and block memories in AES imple entation. However, the parity schemes in 
previous research [76][77] did not cover errors occurring in the logic blocks, routing, and control 
circuitry. 
In this research, novel enhancements to a parity scheme were introduced and applied to the 
MixColumns transformation. Unlike previous research, the enhancement proposed at the register-
transfer level increases the error coverage of a parity scheme from the datapath flip-flops to logic 
blocks, and routing. This is important since not only flip-flops can be target of soft errors but also 
SRAM cells building logic blocks and routing can be affected.  
Soft errors on FPGA were modeled using the pin fault model, verified by simulating errors in the 
implementation. In order to simulate SEUs, bits were flipped in the configuration file one at a time. 
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Then the configuration file simulating SEUs was downloaded on the FPGA. Since the mapping of the 
netlist after place and route in the configuration file is proprietary information, the challenge was to 
find the configuration bits that were related to a specific net. To overcome this challenge, the net was
removed from the netlist manually after place and route and the modified configuration file was 
generated. The original and modified configuration files were compared to find the bits related to the 
specific net that was removed. Then each bit of the net was flipped one at a time to produce the 
configuration file simulating SEUs. Finally, the outp t bits of this implementation containing a soft 
error were observed. The pin fault model was confirmed by simulating SEUs. 
The pin fault model was used to find the weaknesses of a parity scheme. Weaknesses include 2 
cases: 1) a single error affects an even number of bits in an 8-bit element of the state and 2) a single 
error affects the parity prediction and output producing circuit simultaneously such that the error is 
not detected. These weaknesses were investigated in 2 separate phases: logic blocks and routing. In 
logic blocks, to avoid the 2 cases, LUTs were examined thoroughly. LUTs were designed manually if 
found to contain any weaknesses that were the result of LUT sharing between output bits having the 
same parity bit. Therefore, sharing of LUTs was modifie  to eliminate the weaknesses (refer to 
Section 5.1.2). 
In the routing phase, the weaknesses caused by multiple fanout signals connected to output bits 
having the same parity bit were investigated. Manually changing of multiple fanout pins in a net at 
the fine-grained level is not possible with the available FPGA tools after place and route. Therefore, 
modification of the routing became a challenge. To overcome this obstacle, extra flip-flops were 
inserted at the register-transfer level to manually change the way pins were formed along a multiple 
fanout net. This modification was verified by simulating SEUs (flipping 1 bit at a time in the 
configuration file) for a small part of MixColumns. Then this was expanded for all the output bits 
protected by the parity bit. The proposed enhanced parity scheme in this research expands the error 
coverage to combinational logic and routing. 
 The insufficiency of known error correction techniques such as TMR and Hamming code [75] on 
FPGAs was pointed out and self reconfiguration was suggested instead. This was designed and 
implemented as a system on chip that communicates with the host PC to trigger reconfiguration of 
FPGA. The hardware part of this system was implemented using the PowerPC 405 processor and the 
UART IP core and implementing master, slave, and interrupt attachments in the proposed AES 
module with error detection. In case of an error, the AES module interrupts the PowerPC 405 
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processor that sends the error message to the host PC through the serial communication. Then the host 
PC interrupt handler performs JTAG boundary scan configuration on the FPGA. The software part of 
this system on chip was programming device drivers for the PowerPC 405 processor and host PC.  
To provide fair comparisons, different approaches providing error detection for AES were 
implemented on the same platform. Unlike previous AES designs using a parity scheme for error 
detection, the proposed technique significantly expands the soft error coverage from datapath 
registers to both logic and routing resources of datap th and control circuitry on FPGA. When 
compared with the AES in composite fields [102] with the parity scheme [77], the proposed design 
uses about half the number of LUTs. The other impleentation of AES [76] that is memory based 
utilizes twice the block memories used in the proposed implementation. The routing of the dual 
ported block memory is the critical path in design of this research. There is about 13% reduction in 
the clock frequency and throughput compared to [76]. Since the memory based AES relies heavily on 
block memories to provide various computations it has about 25% less power consumption than the 
proposed design. 
In addition to the parity schemes, DMR was implemented for further comparisons. The DMR 
implementation compared to the proposed design has about 33%, 3.8%, and 100% increase in I/O 
pins, LUTs, and block memories, respectively. The clock frequency and throughput is approximately 
5% higher in the proposed design than DMR. Since the DMR approach relies more on block 
memories (SubBytes as opposed to inverse is computed completely using block memories), there is a 
slight decrease of about 2% in power consumption of DMR compared to the proposed 
implementation. DMR detects multiple errors having extremely low likelihood in case of soft errors. 
Unlike DMR, the proposed AES with enhanced parity scheme provides low cost adequate method 
that covers single errors.  
The number of flip-flops in the proposed implementation is the largest amongst all. The flip-flops 
are used to delay the input of the dual ported block memory and also control routing at the register-
transfer level. Nevertheless, the number of flip-flops is not greater than that of LUTs, and thus this is 
still a balanced design practice. 
The main goal of error detection was reliability in this research. However, the proposed technique 
may also be applied against cryptanalysis of AES with certain assumptions. Multiple errors are 
detected in the SubBytes transformation. Therefore, the proposed error detection technique may 
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thwart faults attacks where multiple attacks are inj cted during SubBytes. Detection of a single or an 
odd number of errors is provided in MixColumns and AddRoundKey transformations. Hence in cases 
where the number of errors in these two AES transformations is not always even, the proposed 
method may be applied. Thus attacks such as [20] (a fault is injected after the initial AddRoundKey) 
or the first attack in [30] (a fault injected at the beginning of the final round) may be thwarted by the 
proposed technique. 
Reliability of the AES implementation is a critical issue especially in large scale systems using 
multiple FPGAs and space applications.  In these typ s of applications, soft error resistant design is 
an important concern. For the first time this research has proposed a heterogeneous error detection 
approach utilizing properties of the circuit and functionality in order to provide adequate reliability at 
the lowest possible cost. Unlike previous research, architectural redesign at the register-transfer level 
was introduced to resolve undetected single errors in both the routing and the combinational logic. 
This research is important for providing soft error esistant design for FPGAs in applications which 
are crucial for many secure space and terrestrial applications. 
7.1 Future Work 
Future work in this research will mainly proceed in 3 different directions: (a) adding enhanced 
features to software tools, (b) exploiting the proposed technique on ASIC for SETs (glitches that 
potentially cause errors), and (c) examining other reconfiguration techniques. Propagation of errors in 
routing from an input net to output bits after place and route was investigated manually in this 
research. This can be incorporated and automated as a feature in the software tools. Therefore, the 
process of finding the pins that lead up to undetect d single errors can be speeded up. An error at 
these pins can potentially affect an even number of output bits or both the parity bit and output bits, 
and thus go undetected in the parity scheme. The process of simulating SEUs in the combinational 
logic or routing of an implementation can also be provided as another feature. Therefore, the designer 
would be able to see the effects of soft errors on outputs. 
The way pins are modified in multiple fanout nets is by manually inserting extra flip-flops. The 
modifications basically include grouping of outputs bits connected to a pin in a multiple fanout net by 
using the extra flip-flops. This results in an increase in the number of flip-flops. In order to improve 
this, software tools should allow fine-grained contr l and modification over pins in multiple fanout 
nets in the design flow. Therefore, the numbers of flip-flops used could be reduced. 
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Implementations in ASICs do not suffer from SEUs in the combinational logic or routing. 
However, there is still the issue of SETs propagatin  through logic paths and getting stored in 
registers. Since clock frequencies continue to increase, this problem remains important as technology 
advances. The proposed technique can be further used in AES implemented in ASICs to mitigate 
SETs. 
In this research, JTAG boundary scan configuration mode was used in the FPGA. Partial 
configuration that involves determining which frames (a frame is the smallest segment of 
configuration memory space) to reconfigure can also be investigated to examine possible delay 
reductions. Remote reconfiguration that includes the Ethernet port, SDRAM, and external Flash is 
also an interesting topic to be further studied. 
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Appendix A 
Glossary of Acronyms 
AddRoundKey add round key transformation 
AES Advanced Encryption Standard 
ALU Arithmetic and Logic Unit 
ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit 
BPSG borophosphosilicate glass 
CBC mode cipher block chaining mode 
CCM mode counter with cipher block chaining-message uthentication code mode 
CCSDS Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems 
CFB cipher feedback 
CMAC mode cipher-based message authentication code m  
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Checking 
CTR mode counter mode 
DES Data Encryption Standard 
DFA Differential Fault Analysis 
DMR Double Modular Redundancy 
DRAM Dynamic RAM 
ECB mode electronic codebook (ECB) mode 
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FIT Failure In Time 
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Arrays 
GCM mode Galois/counter mode 
GF  Galois Field 
LET Linear Energy Transfer 
LUT Look Up Table 
OFB output feedback 
MBU Multiple Bit Upset 
MixColumns mix columns transformation 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
PIP Programmable Interconnect Point 
critQ  critical charge 
SEFI Single Event Functional Interrupt 
SET Single Event Transient 
SEU Single Event Upset 
ShiftRows shift rows Transformation 
SOI Silicon on Insulator 
SRAM Static RAM 
SubBytes substitution transformation 
TMR Triple Modular Redundancy 
VHDL  Very high speed integrated circuit (VHSIC) Hardware Description Language 
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Appendix B 
AES in System on Chip 
In this appendix, the system including the AES module is presented. Software and hardware 
elements that build the whole system on chip are discussed. Board level communication with the host 
PC is described briefly. The hardware elements include the proposed design of AES with error 
detection along with other IPs on the FPGA. Different hardware IPs and attachments (i.e. master, 
slave, and interrupt attachments) to the AES module are also discussed. 
The software elements are device drivers and application software. There is a device driver for the 
AES module and another device driver for the host PC o perform self reconfiguration of the FPGA in 
case of a soft error. 
The baseline for the AMIRIX board provided by CMC is used in this project. The Xilinx Platform 
Studio (XPS) version 10.1.03 is the development enviro ment for designing the hardware and 
software of the embedded processor system. XPS which is part of the Embedded Development Kit 
(EDK) provides an environment to build hardware IPs and device drivers and libraries for embedded 
software development.  
Debug and verification of the software program running on the PowerPC 405 processor is mainly 
done by Xilinx Microprocessor Debugger (XMD).  As shown Figure 55, XMD connects to the 
PowerPC 405 processor through a JTAG connection. The J AG chain inside the FPGA is through the 
2 processors. The JTAG chain includes an interface bus that contains all the JTAG signals. 
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Communication to and control of the application software as illustrated in Figure 55 is done by the 
GNU Debugger remote TCP protocol. 
 
 
Figure 55 Debugging software running on PowerPC 405 processor 
 
B.1 Device Driver and Application Software 
The high level view of the system interconnection including the board (AMIRIX AP1100) and the 
host PC is illustrated in Figure 56. The Virtex-II Pro FPGA, which is the central component on the 
board, connects to the host PC processor by sending messages through the PowerPC 405 processor 
(PowerPC 405 is the processor on the Virtex-II Pro FPGA). 
 
 
Figure 56 Board level connections 
 
 121 
In case of an error occurrence, the PowerPC 405 process r sends an error message through the 
Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter (UART) IP on the FPGA to the host PC processor. 
Then this error message triggers an interrupt in the host PC to perform reconfiguration on the FPGA. 
This mechanism includes interrupting both the PowerPC 405 processor on the FPGA and the host PC 
processor. This is further described in more details as follows. 
The PowerPC 405 processor should be interrupted when the AES Module sends an interrupt to it in 
case of an error. The operating system of the PowerPC 405 processor is standalone which provides 
the board support package.  The board support package is a set of software modules that provide 
access to processor specific functions. These functions are used when an application accesses board 
or processor features directly. This package is a single threaded library in which there is no operating 
system between the application and the hardware platform. Application software operates on the 
hardware platform through direct driver calls.  The software layers are illustrated in Figure 57. 
 
 
Figure 57 Software layers for processor in FPGA 
 
The device driver for the AES module sends the error message “Error!” onto the serial port through 
UART. In order to set up the interrupt in the software on the FPGA side, the following steps are 
taken. The interrupt vector is setup through the initialization function XExc_Init(). This function 
should be called before registering any interrupts. 
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 The interrupt handler is registered through function XExc_RegisterHandler(). 
 After registering the interrupt handler, the interrupt should be enabled. This is done by 
function XExc_mEnableExceptions(). 
On the host PC side, there should be an interrupt handler that reacts upon receiving the error 
message sent to the serial port through UART. The int rrupt handler basically reconfigures the 
FPGA. The following steps show how this is achieved. All the functions used are in header 
“windows.h”, which is a header file for the Windows API. 
 The serial port (COM1) is opened by function CreateFile(). 
 The UART parameters (baud rate, data bits, parity, stop bits, and flow control) for the 
receiver serial port on the host PC should be set properly. 
 Time-out parameters should be set correctly, otherwis  reads and writes from the serial 
port return unexpected values. In order to read all the values until the UART buffer is 
empty, the time-out values are applied as follows. 
 
 





 The following is a snippet from the software that is written to reconfigure the FPGA in 
case of an error occurrence (the complete code is provided in Appendix D). Function 
WaitCommEvent() is used to wait on an event of receiving a byte on the UART of the 
receiver serial port. After receiving an event, theUART buffer is read. The advantage of 
this approach is that the host computer does not need to poll for synchronization, which is 
inefficient for incoming data. As seen in this piece of code with clarifying comments, the 
message read from the buffer is compared to error message “Error!”.  The configuration 
tool iMPACT is run in the batch mode and the commands are passed to it through the .cmd 
file. To run iMPACT in the batch mode function Creat Process() is used. All the 





for  ( ; ; ) { 
 index=0; 
 if  (WaitCommEvent(comport, &dwCommEvent, NULL)) { 
  do { 
   if  (ReadFile(comport, &INBUFFER,1, &bytes_read,NULL))  { 
    if  (bytes_read!=0) { // A byte has been read. 
     message[index]=INBUFFER[0]; 
     index ++; 
    } 
    if  (bytes_read==0) { // Buffer is empty. 
     message[index]=NULL; // Terminating array 
     if  (strcmp(message, "Error!\0" )==0) { 
      printf( "FPGA should be reconfigured!\n" ); 
      // FPGA reconfiguration below 
      CreateProcess(NULL, // module name 
      "impact -batch _impact.cmd" , // Command line 
      NULL, // Process handle not inheritable 
      NULL, // Thread handle not inheritable 
      FALSE, // Set handle inheritance to FALSE 
      0, // No creation flags 
      NULL, // Use parent's environment block 
      NULL, // Use parent's starting directory 
      &si, // Pointer to STARTUPINFO structure 
      &pi) // Pointer to PROCESS_INFORMATION struct ure 
     } 
    } 
   } else { 
    // An error occurred in the ReadFile call. 
    break ; 
   } 
  } while (bytes_read); // Buffer is not empty. 
 } else { // Error in WaitCommEvent. 
 } 
} 
The main steps in the .cmd file to perform configuration are briefly noted below (configuration 
details can be found in [2, 128]). 
 Switching to JTAG boundary scan configuration mode by command setMode 
 Specifying the cable parameters (such as speed and port) by command setCable 
 Identifying the devices in the JTAG boundary scan chain by command Identify 
 Adding the device to the list of devices to be configured by command addDevice 
 Deletes unnecessary devices from a device chain by command deleteDevice 
 Programming the FPGA by command Program 
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The steps above are for configuring the FPGA when JTAG boundary scan is used. JTAG boundary 
scan, formally known as IEEE Standard 1149.1, is primarily a testing standard created to alleviate the 
growing cost of testing digital systems. The primary benefit of the standard is the ability to transform 
extremely difficult printed circuit board testing problems (that could only be attacked with ad-hoc 
testing methods) into well-structured problems that software can handle easily and efficiently. 
Furthermore, vendor-specific extensions to boundary scan JTAG have been developed to allow 
execution of maintenance and diagnostic applications as well as programming algorithms for 
reconfigurable parts. 
B.2 AES Module and IPs in System 
In addition to the main functionality of AES, the pro osed module implemented should provide 
other interfaces to communicate with other IPs on the FPGA to build the complete system on chip. 
Figure 58 depicts the main IPs that are used to build the system. The Processor Local Bus (PLB) is 
the 64-bit local bus for the embedded PowerPC 405 processor. This PLB is compatible with IBM 
CoreConnect PLB.  
Along with the PowerPC 405 processor, the AES module is connected to the PLB. The ciphertext 
outputs are stored in a block memory that is also connected to the PLB through a controller as a slave 
device. The main features required in the AES module to interact with other IPs on chip include the 
PLB master and salve supports and interrupt (these features are discussed in more detail later on in 
this section). 
The UART IP on the 32-bit On-chip Peripheral Bus (OPB) is the standard input/output device. 
Therefore, input/output functions such as xil_printf() (this function is similar to printf() but much 
smaller in size (only 1 kB)) are sent to UART to be handled. The PLB to OPB bridge allows access 
from the PLB to the OPB. This bridge translates PLB transactions into OPB transactions. It functions 




Figure 58 IPs in system on chip 
 
The structure of the AES module is depicted in more detail in Figure 59. As shown in this figure, 
the master and slave features and interrupt are provided as attachments in the PLB IP interface (IPIF).  
 
 
Figure 59 IP Interface (IPIF) 
The interconnection between the IPIF and AES using features provided by the IPIF is denoted IP 
Interconnect (IPIC) in Figure 59. The signals used in the IPIC are shown in Figure 60. Detailed 




Figure 60 IP Interconnect (IPIC) 
 
The master attachment enables the AES module to initiate transfers on the PLB.  The master device 
requires access to the slave device to perform operations. This is illustrated as local transfer request 
and reply between the master and slave attachments in Figure 61. For instance, in a master read or 
write transaction, the salve registers provided by the slave attachment are either read from or written 
into. The address of the slave registers is the source for a master write and the sink for the master 
read.  There are 128 control signals needed to be set for the IP master request in IPIC that is shown in 




Figure 61 Master and slave attachments 
 
To receive inputs from the software application running on the PowerPC 405 processor, the slave 
attachment registers (slave address space) are used. Th  slave registers get the inputs from the 64-bit 
PLB from the application software. 
On the other hand, when the ciphertext output is ready the master attachment initiates a PLB 
transfer to write into the block memory residing on the same bus. The ciphertext output is first stored 
in the slave address space (or equivalently, in the slave registers). When writing the ciphertext output, 
the source address is a range from the slave address space that corresponds to the result registers. 
These slave registers are the same size as the PLB data width that is 64 bits. The destination address 
in the master write transfer on the PLB is a block memory address.  
As shown in Figure 62, the interrupt port of the AES module is the output port in the interrupt 
attachment of the IPIF. The interrupt port of the AES module is connected to an interrupt port of the 
PowerPC 405 processor (Figure 62). The interrupt is triggered by the AES module when there is an 
error in computing the output. In the MixColumns and AddRoundKey transformations of the AES 
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module, the error detection is done through parity detection technique that is enhanced to expand its 
error coverage to combinational logic of datapath and routing in the FPGA. Additionally, dual ported 
block memory and duplication is used in SubBytes and the control circuitry, respectively, to detect 
errors (refer to Chapter 5).  
 
 
Figure 62 Interrupt in AES module 
 
In case of an error occurrence, the PowerPC 405 process r sends the error message “Error!” to the 
host PC through the UART IP and the serial port (the sending of error message is done in the interrupt 
handler of the Aes module). Setting up the device driver (interrupt initialization, registering interrupt 
handler, and enabling the interrupt) in the AES module is described briefly in Section 0. The error 
message received on the host PC serial port initiates FPGA reconfiguration (interrupt handling due to 
error message on the host PC side is also presented briefly in Section 0). The memory address space 
of the PowerPC 405 processor is 4GB. The unused memory address space of the baseline provided by 
CMC is used to add new IPs to buses. Table 7.1 show the address space assignment to the IPs shown 
in Figure 58. 
 
Table 7.1 Memory address space of IPs 
IP Base address High address Size Buss connection 
AES module 0x40000000 0x400003ff 1kB PLB bus 
block memory 0xffff0000 0xffffffff 64kB  PLB bus  




The AES module can further implement block cipher modes using the proposed AES with error 
detection discussed in Chapter 5. There are different options for implementing these modes. They can 
be implemented entirely in hardware or as a hardware/software codesign (designing a block cipher 
mode simultaneously using the microprocessor and FPGA logic blocks). As discussed in Section 4.2, 
these modes use the AES algorithm multiple times either in parallel (e.g., in ECB and CTR) or in 
serial (e.g., in modes with the chaining structure such as CBC) in the algorithm. Depending on the 
hardware, throughput, and latency requirements in an application specification, design choices should 
be made properly. In this research, the main goal is to provide high error coverage for single bit errors 
in the FPGA while having the minimum hardware resources. 
Reusing hardware in a partially pipeline design (that cannot accept data every clock cycle, and thus 
has a throughput less than 1 per clock cycle) allows for hardware savings at the cost of throughput. 
On the other hand, a fully pipelined design with a typically higher hardware usage can achieve the 
highest throughput and accept data every clock cycle.  
In an implementation that is a hardware/software codesign interfacing should also be considered 
carefully. Since the hardware and software parts of the design need to communicate with each other 
through some sort of synchronization technique (for instance, polling and interrupts). Synchronization 
costs in terms of performance. For instance, when the hardware part of the design finishes its 
computation it needs to communicate with the software part and vice versa. This communication 
through the bus and synchronization has a delay that can be significant compared to the overall 
latency. 
The latency (number of clock cycles from inputs to outputs) of block cipher modes that have the 
chaining of plaintext blocks with the previous ciphertext blocks is constrained by this chaining 
structure (e.g., in CBC shown in Figure 26). Therefor , the latency cannot be improved be adding 
more AES ciphers (increasing hardware usage) to run in parallel. On the other hand, the latency in 
block cipher modes that do not have this chaining structure, for instance in the CTR mode shown in 
Figure 27, is reduced by running more AES ciphers in parallel. 
B.3 Summary 
The main goal of this appendix was to cover different aspects of design and implementation of the 
AES module as a system on chip in the FPGA. This system has the capability to self reconfigure in 
case of an error in the FPGA through serial communication with the host PC. Communication and 
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synchronization of the proposed AES module having error detection capability, the PowerPC 405 
processor in the FPGA, and the host PC were describd. 
In the AES module, different features that were implemented as slave, master, and interrupt 
attachments to communicate with other IPs and to interrupt the PowerPC 405 processor in the FPGA 
were described. Device drivers that provide interrupt handling on the PowerPC 405 processor and the 
host PC were also covered in this appendix. Considerations in design and implementing different 
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Appendix C 
Control Circuitry in AES 
 
 





Figure 64 State machine of round in AES 
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Appendix D 
Device Driver for FPGA Reconfiguration 
 
#include  "windows.h" 
#include  "stdio.h" 
#include  "conio.h" 
 




unsigned  int  index=0; 
COMMTIMEOUTS timeouts, orig_timeouts; 
DWORD dwCommEvent; 
char  INBUFFER[500]; 
char  message[500]; 
char  OUTBUFFER[20]; 
DWORD bytes_read=0; // Number of bytes read from port 
DWORD bytes_written=0; // Number of bytes written to the port 
HANDLE comport=NULL; // Handle COM port 
DCB comSettings, orig_comSettings; // Contains various port settings 
 
ZeroMemory(&si, sizeof (si)); 
si.cb = sizeof (si); 
ZeroMemory(&pi, sizeof (pi)); 
 
// Open COM port 
comport=CreateFile( "COM1", // open io port: 
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            GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, // for reading and writing 
            0, // exclusive access 
            NULL, // no security attributes 
            OPEN_EXISTING,               
            FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, 
            NULL); 
 
if  ((comport==INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)) { // error processing code goes here 










comSettings.fBinary= false ;  
if  (!SetCommState(comport, &comSettings)) { 
   printf( "SetCommState!\n" ); 
} 
 
printf( "BaudRate %i\n" , comSettings.BaudRate);  
printf( "StopBits %i\n" , comSettings.StopBits); 
printf( "fParity %i\n" , comSettings.fParity);  
printf( "Parity %i\n" , comSettings.Parity); 
 
//In order for ReadFile to return 0 bytes read, the  ReadIntervalTimeout member of the 
COMMTIMEOUTS structure is set to MAXDWORD, and the ReadTimeoutMultiplier and 






if  (!SetCommTimeouts(comport, &timeouts)) { 
   printf( "SetCommTimeouts!\n" ); 
} 
 
if  (!SetCommMask(comport, EV_RXCHAR)) { 
 printf( "error in SetCommMask!\n" ); 
} 
 
for  ( ; ; ) { 
 index=0; 
 if  (WaitCommEvent(comport, &dwCommEvent, NULL)) { 
  do { 
   if  (ReadFile(comport, &INBUFFER,1, &bytes_read,NULL))  { 
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    if  (bytes_read!=0) { // A byte has been read. 
     message[index]=INBUFFER[0]; 
     index ++; 
    } 
    if  (bytes_read==0) { // Buffer is empty. 
     message[index]=NULL; // Terminating array 
     if  (strcmp(message, "Error!\0" )==0) { 
      printf( "FPGA should be reconfigured!\n" ); 
      // FPGA reconfiguration below 
      CreateProcess(NULL, // module name 
      "impact -batch _impact.cmd" , // Command line 
      NULL, // Process handle not inheritable 
      NULL, // Thread handle not inheritable 
      FALSE, // Set handle inheritance to FALSE 
      0, // No creation flags 
      NULL, // Use parent's environment block 
      NULL, // Use parent's starting directory 
      &si, // Pointer to STARTUPINFO structure 
      &pi) // Pointer to PROCESS_INFORMATION struct ure 
     } 
    } 
   } else { 
    // An error occurred in the ReadFile call. 
    break ; 
   } 
  } while (bytes_read); // Buffer is not empty. 








char  quit; 
while  ((quit=getchar())!= 'q' ); 
printf( "%c" , quit); 
 
return  0; 
} 
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Appendix E 
Processor Local Bus IP Interface 
 
Figure 65 Connections of Processor Local Bus (PLB) IP Interface (IPIF) [129] 
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Table 7.2 IP Interconnect (IPIC) signals [129] 
-- IP Interconnect (IPIC) signal declarations 
-- Prefix 'i' stands for IPIF while prefix 'u' stands for user logic. 
-- Typically user logic will be hooked up to IPIF directly via i<sig> unless signal slicing and muxing              
-- are needed via u<sig> 
signal iBus2IP_Clk : std_logic; 
signal iBus2IP_Reset : std_logic; 
signal iIP2Bus_IntrEvent : std_logic_vector(0 to IP_INTR_MODE_ARRAY'length - 1); 
signal iIP2Bus_Data : std_logic_vector(0 to C_PLB_DWI TH-1); 
signal iIP2Bus_WrAck : std_logic   := '0'; 
signal iIP2Bus_RdAck : std_logic   := '0'; 
signal iIP2Bus_Retry : std_logic   := '0'; 
signal iIP2Bus_Error : std_logic   := '0'; 
signal iIP2Bus_ToutSup : std_logic   := '0'; 
signal iBus2IP_Addr : std_logic_vector(0 to C_PLB_AWIDTH - 1); 
signal iBus2IP_Data : std_logic_vector(0 to C_PLB_DWI TH - 1); 
signal iBus2IP_RNW : std_logic; 
signal iBus2IP_BE : std_logic_vector(0 to (C_PLB_DWIDTH/8) - 1); 
signal iBus2IP_Burst : std_logic; 
signal iBus2IP_WrReq : std_logic; 
signal iBus2IP_RdReq : std_logic; 
signal iBus2IP_RdCE : std_logic_vector(0 to calc_num_ce(ARD_NUM_CE_ARRAY)-1); 
signal iBus2IP_WrCE : std_logic_vector(0 to calc_num_ce(ARD_NUM_CE_ARRAY)-1); 
signal iIP2Bus_Addr : std_logic_vector(0 to IPIF_AWIDTH - 1); 
signal iIP2Bus_MstBE : std_logic_vector(0 to (IPIF_DWIDTH/8) - 1); 
signal iIP2IP_Addr : std_logic_vector(0 to IPIF_AWIDTH - 1); 
signal iIP2Bus_MstWrReq : std_logic   := '0'; 
signal iIP2Bus_MstRdReq : std_logic   := '0'; 
signal iIP2Bus_MstBurst : std_logic   := '0'; 
signal iIP2Bus_MstBusLock : std_logic   := '0'; 
signal iIP2Bus_MstNum : std_logic_vector(0 to log2(DEV_MAX_BURST_SIZE/(C_PLB_DWIDTH/8))); 
signal iBus2IP_MstWrAck : std_logic; 
signal iBus2IP_MstRdAck : std_logic; 
signal iBus2IP_MstRetry : std_logic; 
  signal iBus2IP_MstError : std_logic; 
signal iBus2IP_MstTimeOut : std_logic; 
signal iBus2IP_MstLastAck : std_logic; 
signal ZERO_IP2RFIFO_Data : std_logic_vector(0 to find_id_dwidth(ARD_ID_ARRAY, ARD_DWIDTH_ARRAY, 
IPIF_RDFIFO_DATA, 32)-1); 
signal iBus2IP_CS : std_logic_vector(0 to ((ARD_ADDR_RANGE_ARRAY'LENGTH)/2)-1); 
signal uBus2IP_Data : std_logic_vector(0 to USER_DWI TH-1); 
signal uBus2IP_BE : std_logic_vector(0 to USER_DWIDTH/8-1); 
signal uBus2IP_RdCE : std_logic_vector(0 to USER_NUM_CE-1); 
signal uBus2IP_WrCE : std_logic_vector(0 to USER_NUM_CE-1); 
signal uIP2Bus_Data : std_logic_vector(0 to USER_DWI TH-1); 
signal uIP2Bus_Data : std_logic_vector(0 to USER_DWI TH-1); 
signal uBus2IP_ArData : std_logic_vector(0 to USER_MAX_AR_DWIDTH-1); 
signal uBus2IP_ArBE : std_logic_vector(0 to USER_MAX_AR_DWIDTH/8-1); 
signal uBus2IP_ArCS : std_logic_vector(0 to USER_NUM_ADDR_RNG-1); 
signal uIP2Bus_ArData : std_logic_vector(0 to USER_MAX_AR_DWIDTH-1); 
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Appendix F 
S-box of AES 
Table 7.3 S-box of AES 
63 7c 77 7b f2 6b 6f c5 30 01 67 2b fe d7 ab 76 
ca 82 c9 7d fa 59 47 f0 ad d4 a2 af 9c a4 72 c0 
b7 fd 93 26 36 3f f7 cc 34 a5 e5 f1 71 d8 31 15 
04 c7 23 c3 18 96 05 9a 07 12 80 e2 eb 27 b2 75 
09 83 2c 1a 1b 6e 5a a0 52 3b d6 b3 29 e3 2f 84 
53 d1 00 ed 20 fc b1 5b 6a cb be 39 4a 4c 58 cf 
d0 ef aa fb 43 4d 33 85 45 f9 02 7f 50 3c 9f a8 
51 a3 40 8f 92 9d 38 f5 bc b6 da 21 10 ff f3 d2 
cd 0c 13 ec 5f 97 44 17 c4 a7 7e 3d 64 5d 19 73 
60 81 4f dc 22 2a 90 88 46 ee b8 14 de 5e 0b db 
e0 32 3a 0a 49 06 24 5c c2 d3 ac 62 91 95 e4 79 
e7 c8 37 6d 8d d5 4e a9 6c 56 f4 ea 65 7a ae 08 
ba 78 25 2e 1c a6 b4 c6 e8 dd 74 1f 4b bd 8b 8a 
70 3e b5 66 48 03 f6 0e 61 35 57 b9 86 c1 1d 9e 
e1 f8 98 11 69 d9 8e 94 9b 1e 87 e9 ce 55 28 df 
8c a1 89 0d bf e6 42 68 41 99 2d 0f b0 54 bb 16 
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Appendix G 
Pseudo Code for Key Expansion 
In the following pseudo code for the key expansion, parameters Nk and Nr represent number of 
words forming a key and number of rounds, respectivly. Subword takes four 8-bit elements of a 
word and applies the substitution transformation on them.  
KeyExpansion(byte key[4*Nk], word w[4*(Nr+1)], Nk) 
begin 
word temp 
i = 0 
while (i < Nk) 
w[i] = word(key[4*i], key[4*i+1], key[4*i+2], key[4 *i+3]) 
i = i+1 
end while 
i = Nk 
while (i < 4 * (Nr+1)] 
temp = w[i-1] 
if (i mod Nk = 0) 
temp = SubWord(RotWord(temp)) xor Rcon[i/Nk] 
else if (Nk > 6 and i mod Nk = 4) 
temp = SubWord(temp) 
end if 
w[i] = w[i-Nk] xor temp 
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Appendix H 
Routed Netlist Snapshots from FPGA Editor 
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